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This project is part of a Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) for the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM). This SMA provides planning support for complex 
operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not 
currently within core PACOM competencies. The Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
contribution overcomes the current conceptualization limitations by using a Systems 
Dynamics (SD) viewpoint to examine U.S.–China relations. This approach employs 
systems thinking and systems dynamics methodologies to analyze the policy structures of 
major issues of concern common to U.S. and China which result in non-linear and 
dynamic behavior over time. The SD model developed is composed of four sectors of 
common concern: energy demand and resources, demographics and stability, economics, 
and military actions. These sector models are used to model tension between the U.S. and 
China over the next 25 years. Tension was chosen as an underlying surrogate to overall 
U.S.–China relations. A simulation tool was developed assist policy makers in better 
understanding how the system's variables are related, how they influence one another, 
and how they are influenced by the system's external environment. The simulation tool 
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This project is part of a Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) for the U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) entitled Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-Pacific Region in 
the Next 5-25 Years. In general, SMA provides planning support to Commands for complex 
operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not currently 
within core Service/Agency competencies. Solutions and participants are sought across the U.S. 
Government (USG) and beyond in order to cast a wide net to capture the brains needed to study 
these challenging problems. The products of the SMA are accepted and synchronized by Joint 
Staff (JS/J-3/DDGO) and executed by ASD (R&E) / RRTO.  
Specifically, PACOM desires to identify areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the 
Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades. The SMA is being organized to:  
1. Examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends  
2. Identify where U.S. strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and 
other interests worldwide, and in particular, to the East China Sea  
3. Leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context”  
a. Drivers of Divergence/Conflict  
b. Drivers of Convergence  
This SMA is expected to develop an outline of areas of strategic risks and conflicting 
interests as well as potential opportunities for encouraging cooperation between the United States 
and Asia-Pacific regional actors with particular emphasis on East China Sea to better understand 
the dynamics of this complex environment and relationship. The project period of performance 
was March 2014 to April 2015. 
Officially referred to as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the nation will be referred 
to as China throughout this report. References to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) refer to 
the ruling political party of the Chinese government. While comprising many different ethnic 




A potential shortcoming in current conceptualizations of conflict and cooperation is the 
inability to integrate our knowledge of the multiple dimensions of the problem—military, trade, 
demographics, technology, natural resources—into an integrated whole. Treatments of the 
problem, whether in academic or public discourse, invariably emphasize one aspect or problem 
area. This fragmentation of knowledge is not a reflection of the way the world works, but rather 
is the result of the analytic lens we impose—our natural predisposition when confronting a 
difficult problem to take things apart and treat the parts separately. The challenge to us today in 
addressing conflict—indeed, many of our persistent inter-state problems—is to “put things back 
together” again, after they have been examined in pieces. Such a holistic perspective does not 
imply denying the independent roles of the separate factors (technology, demographics, natural 
resources), but rather entails integrating them into a broader framework that incorporates the 
interactions between them—interactions that tend to get lost when the individual mechanisms are 
examined in isolation. 
B. PURPOSE 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) partnered in this SMA by providing a systems 
approach to studying the dynamics of the issues involved to overcome the limitations of current 
conceptualizations. Among the key issues of mutual concern are U.S.-China economic trade 
barriers and imbalances, food security, agricultural policies, water management, climate change 
and carbon-based fuel alternatives, scarcity of resources (from soil nutrients to minerals for 
manufacturing), freedom / denial of access and intrusion issues (Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ), cyberspace, et al.), military challenges and opportunities, high technology and academic 
exchanges, human rights, national demographics and their impacts on economies, human 
migration, Third World development, and others. Failing to recognize the systemic nature of the 
issues surrounding the drivers of conflict and convergence and their interconnectedness, and 
bifurcating “Economic” and “Strategic/Security” topics, robs the USG of an advantage, since 
China almost certainly views all of these issues within the context of a unified “strategy 
C. OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this strategic planning project is to inform decision makers of 
the complexity of the environment in which they, and their competitors, operate and to broaden 
the horizon of their strategic thinking. Research in the areas of complexity and systems thinking 
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covers a spectrum of concepts that frame regional and global environments. Common in much of 
this analysis is a focus on determining system boundaries, endogenous and exogenous impacts, 
identification and implementation of feedback loops, and an appreciation of the delays and time 
frames required to provide a sufficient understanding of relationships within and between 
systems. An efficacious strategic planning process must be focused on enhancing the ability of 
decision makers to make sense of an uncertain and complex environment. 
D. SCOPE 
The NPS effort was not primarily intended to advance and/or contribute to existing 
theory, but rather to build upon existing understanding of the sources and consequences of 
conflict as articulated in the Carnegie study. The systems dynamics modeling effort provided the 
systems thinking methodology and tools to integrate multiple perspectives (economic, political, 
demographic, technological, etc.) into an integrated whole. Dynamic feedback relationships 
which are typically represented more qualitatively in other studies were modeled explicitly in 
systems dynamic terms and their significance is explored through simulation. 
E. APPROACH 
The NPS approach employs systems thinking and systems dynamics methodologies to 
analyze, within a single coherent framework, the policy structures of major issues of common 
U.S./China concern that result in non-linear and dynamic behavior over time. In order to address 
the tasking provided by PACOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a team of 
systems engineering and systems dynamics students and faculty from NPS worked with partner 
academics and practitioners identified in the SMA study to formulate the structures and key 
variables in several simple systems dynamics sector models.  
The systems dynamics discipline and methodology was created by Jay Forrester at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Systems dynamics is a powerful method to gain useful 
insight into situations of dynamic complexity and policy resistance (Sterman 2000). With respect 
to systems dynamics, John Sterman stated that, “The heuristics we use to judge causal relations 
lead systematically to cognitive maps that ignore feedbacks, multiple interconnections, time 
delays, and the other elements of dynamic complexity.” He went on to assert that, “…people use 
various cues to causality including temporal and spatial proximity of cause and effect, temporal 
presence of causes, covariation, and similarity of cause and effect…These heuristics lead to 
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difficulty in complex systems…” This process of sense-making has a direct bearing on strategic 
thinking and planning. Systems dynamics is grounded in the theory of non-linear dynamics and 
feedback control developed in mathematics, physics, and engineering. Because these tools are 
applied to the behavior of human as well as physical and technical systems, system dynamics 
draws on cognitive and social psychology, economics, and other social sciences. Human systems 
are driven by feedback loops in which both free choice and constraint are present. In a bounded 
system, the application of systems dynamics can provide both conceptual and qualitative insight. 
By understanding the mechanisms of these feedback loops, it may be possible to maintain the 
desired dynamic equilibrium of the system required to achieve or maintain stability. The use of 
fairly simple systems dynamics models for each of the various sectors was employed as part of a 
structure for providing insight about the behaviors involved.  
These sector models capture, for instance, the bounded problem sets associated with 
U.S.-China relations in the areas of security/defense (including escalation), economics, energy, 
the cyber domain, and environmental concerns/resources (food, water, minerals). Each sector 
was modeled endogenously and linked together in order to determine the collective effects of 
policy decisions in one sector on the others (the system of systems) in order to evaluate the 
potential behavior of the relationship over a twenty year time horizon. The models allow 
decisions-makers to use a “flight control simulator” or “dashboard” to perturbate each system in 
order to better understand non-linear, potential outcomes over time. While this modeling is non-
predictive, it is intended to enhance foresight in a complex strategic environment by exploring 
both the risk and the opportunity space.  
The questions to be addressed for the overall SMA study are divided into three categories, 
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Although portions of any level of these questions may be addressed 
during this study, the priority is to address Tier 1 as the highest priority and Tier 3 as the lowest. 
Items in bold are covered in this report. 
Tier One Priority Questions: 
1. Identify areas of strategic risk in the Asia-Pacific Region over the next two 
decades.(model results and section V) 
2. How will maritime balances of power and relative capability change in the Asia-
Pacific over the next 20 years?  
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3. How does China’s strategy and actions impact other nations in the region? 
(model results and section IV) 
4. Which areas of strategic risk or opportunity (to the U.S., Chinese, Russians, 
Indians, and other nations in PACOM’s AOR) are most likely to occur in the 
next 15-20 years? (models results and section V) 
5. How does USPACOM balance requirements for a force capable of conducting 
theater engagement and security cooperation activities with a force ready to fight 
tonight?  
Tier Two Priority Questions: 
1. Who is the next rising power in Asia?  
2. What are reasonable and pragmatic assumptions about the Asia-Pacific 
region in five year increments out 25 years? (section III and IV) 
3. How does the U.S. strengthen partner nations in the region in a fiscally 
constrained environment?  
4. How does the U.S. encourage more multilateral solutions to challenges in Asia?  
5. How does the rise of India affect the region, particularly Chinese strategy? How 
can USPACOM provide theater security cooperation to emerging partners in the 
Asia-Pacific in ways that strengthen multilateral cooperation and encourages 
adherence to international norms of behavior?  
Tier Three Priority Questions: 
1. What emergent or near-future technologies have the potential to impact Asia or 
U.S. involvement in Asia? How? What are the consequences of these new 
technologies?  
2. What defines a “good” Asia-Pacific strategy? What recommendations comprise 
that strategy? 
F. TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective for the SMA project is to provide decision makers the tools to 
make better sense of the non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms at play in the complex 
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environment in which they, and their competitors, operate, and to broaden the horizon of 
PACOM strategic thinking. The Asia-Pacific region was modeled as a dynamic interconnected 
system of entities that are: 
1. Interdependent and adaptive  
2. Interactive and co-evolving  
3. Respond to their local and global environment  
Such systems exemplify bottom-up emergent phenomena that are fundamentally 
unpredictable. Variables/Levers were identified that provide insights into:  
1. Robustness and/or fragility of an interdependent Asia-Pacific region in a global 
context 
2. Assess transitions such as tipping points  
Long-term regional assessment was based on significant global trends discussed in the 
DNI/NIC 2030 report. Key indicators to be assessed include:  
1. U.S.-China economic trade barriers, imbalances and opportunities  
2. Scarcity of resources (competition and cooperation)  
3. Military challenges and opportunities  
4. National demographics and their impacts on economies, human migration, Third 
World development, and others  
5. Divergence from projected economic growth 
The specific variables associated with these key indicators were determined by the 
overall SMA project team, with NPS addressing them through development of a systems 
thinking approach with systems dynamics modeling. The systems dynamics models were used 
to:  
1. Formulate model structures (key variables & nonlinear feedback interactions) for 
several simple systems dynamics sector models.  
2. Model each sector endogenously and link together to determine collective effects of 
policy decisions in one sector on the others. 
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a. Models serve as policy “flight control simulator” or “dashboard” allowing 
decisions-makers to perturb each system in order gain deeper insight into non-
linear potential outcomes over time.  
b. Enhance foresight in a complex strategic environment by exploring both the 
risk and the opportunity space.  
G. SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODEL VALUE ADDED SUMMARY 
NPS is providing a computational tool to PACOM planners to use directly for dynamic 
simulation. This provides two utilities that add value to the PACOM approach. 
• As a learning tool. This will help policy makers better understand how the system’s 
variables are related and how they influence one another and are influenced by the 
system’s external environment, and/or understand where the leverage points are. A great 
value added is the capacity to make “perfectly” controlled experimentation possible 
because, unlike in real life, the effect of changing one treatment intervention or 
environmental factor can be observed while all other factors are held unchanged. In real 
life, many variables change simultaneously, confounding the interpretation of treatment 
results. Such controlled experimentation can yield useful insights into the efficacy of 
different policy options. 
• As a decision/policy making tool. Computer models do not have to be passive things, 
simply telling us about some slice of reality but not really giving us any special insight 
into how to perhaps shape that reality to our own ends. These models are at their best 
when they allow us to create what-if scenarios to see how that reality might be bent to our 






II. SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODELING OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given that the NPS research effort is intended to develop a learning and decision making 
tool based on non-linear dynamics and feedback mechanisms it is useful to first review the 
general approach to the modeling effort.  
The NPS team used a systems engineering approach to develop a final “dashboard” or 
“flight simulator” for PACOM. The NPS model employs a holistic systems approach, typically 
used in systems engineering, systems thinking, and systems dynamics. Linear thinking is 
conventional in most Western philosophy and thinking habits (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, 
and Smith 1994). Systems thinking is a way of thinking about forces and interrelationships that 
shape the behavior of systems (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith 1994). Systems 
thinking is “…the ability to see the world as a complex system, to understand how everything is 
connected to everything else. With a holistic worldview, it is argued, we would be able to learn 
faster and more effectively, identify high leverage points, avoid policy resistance and make 
decisions consistent with our long-term best interests” (Sterman 2002). In particular, NPS uses 
systems dynamics to implement systems thinking. Systems dynamics “is designed to help us 
learn about the structure and dynamics of the complex systems in which we are embedded, 
design high-leverage policies for sustained improvement, and catalyze successful 
implementation and change” (Sterman 2002). Sterman also asserts that, “…system dynamics 
often involves the development of formal models and management flight simulators to capture 
complex dynamics, and to create an environment for learning and policy design.” (Sterman 
2002). 
Simply stated, the NPS approach recognizes that the variables involved in modeling and 
studying this problem have a high degree of interdependence, rather than a more traditional 
approach that considers a dependent and independent variable structure. In a way, we are 
attempting to provide some methods and tools to transform PACOM into a learning organization 
that will be able to look forward to creating, and shaping, the new world as it emerges, instead of 
simply reacting to it (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith 1994). 
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We partitioned the problem space into separate areas, and modeled each area using a 
commercially off-the-shelf systems dynamics modeling software tool, iThink. The individual 
models allowed us to study each in isolation to verify their behavior. These individual models 
were then interconnected to form a holistic model. This modular approach allows for thinking 
about and studying the systems within the overall complex system of systems (traditionally 
thought of as subsystems – though they exist as independent systems in their own right) 
individually, and then as a whole. 
We began by using archetypes which are used as “training wheels” to get used to 
thinking about the problem in a systems dynamics way, using some standard categories of model 
structures. The archetypes assist in initially forming an interconnected model, but are not used 
for the final modeling process, as models will deviate from standard structures in their own 
unique way. Causal loop diagrams were developed to further the study and development of the 
problem, and as a basis for developing the computational simulation models in iThink. 
B. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Two major building blocks of systems dynamics models must be explained before any 
research specific diagrams are presented. The first is a reinforcing loop (Figure 1). A reinforcing 
loop is used to model a scenario where an increase in one action results in an increase in a 
second action, which in turn results in an increase to the first action. Growth is exponential and 
unlimited for the life of the system. A useful example is interest in a bank account. As the 
 




amount of money in an account increases, the amount of interest increases, as the amount of 
interest increases the amount of money in the account increases. 
Note that Figure 1 also utilizes two plus signs. The plus signs are used to show polarity 
(not necessarily directionality). As such, the loop shows two scenarios. The first scenario is one 
where an increasing Bank Balance results in an increasing Amount of Interest which results in an 
increasing Bank Balance. The second scenario is one where a decreasing Bank Balance results in 
a decreasing Amount of Interest which results in a decreasing Bank Balance. The plus sign 
simply indicates that the second entity will trend in the same direction of the first entity, not that 
the first entity increases the second entity. Similarly, a minus sign indicates that a second entity 
will trend in the opposite direction of the first entity, not that the first entity decreases the second 
entity. Minus signs will be used in the second major building block of systems dynamics model, 
balancing loops.  
Balancing loops (e.g. Figure 2) limit growth, maintain stability, and achieve equilibrium 
(Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith 1994, 117). In a balancing loop, one action results in 
an increase to a second action, and increases to that second action result in a decrease to the first 
action. Similarly, decreases to the second action result in increases to the first action. A predator-
prey situation is a traditional example of a balancing loop. As the population of the predators 
increase, the population of prey decreases. As the population of prey decreases, the population of 
predators decreases. As the population of predators decrease, the population of prey increases. 
 
Figure 2. Balancing Loop 
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As the population of prey increases, the population of predators increases. Uninterrupted, this 
loop will continue in a balancing fashion infinitely.  
Note the importance of defining the plus signs and minus signs in terms of polarity, rather 
than directionality. The minus sign near the arrowhead next to the prey means the number of 
prey reacts inversely to the number of predators (more predators lead to less prey, fewer 
predators lead to more prey). 
C. ASIA-PACIFIC CONFLICT AND CONVERGENCE MODEL OVERVIEW 
Given that general construct for systems dynamics modeling, the first step towards 
development of a comprehensive model was the identification of the overall model boundary as 
well as the key variables that define each segment of the model. Figure 3 presents a high level 
overview of the NPS model. Once contributions from other SMA partners were received, the 
model structures were altered as necessary. Data from those partner reports were also used in 
support of the models. 
 
Figure 3. Asia-Pacific Conflict and Convergence Model (with Archetypes) 
Note that there are five major archetypes are presented in Figure 3 (Accidental 
Adversaries, Shifting the Burden, Tragedy of the Commons, Limits to Growth, and Escalation). 
Each of these archetypes corresponds to a major component of the overall model. The first four 
archetypes are clearly associated with a model subcomponent (note that Shifting the Burden and 
12 
 
Tragedy of the Commons are both utilized in the Energy and Resources model). The Escalation 
archetype is at the center of three components (Defense Spending & Military Capabilities, 
Regional Tension & Potential Conflict, and Foreign Policy Ambitions & Behavior) which were 
aggregated into a more comprehensive Military sub-model. A brief overview of each archetype 
is appropriate to precede more detailed descriptions of each sub-model. After presentation of 
each sub-model, the overall Asia-Pacific Conflict and Convergence Model will be reviewed and 
clarified. 
1. Archetype Descriptions 
One of the most important, and potentially most empowering, insights to come from the 
field of systems thinking is that different systems—whether engineering, military, or 
economic—share common principles in the ways in which system components work together to 
perform some well-defined function. Just as in literature there are common themes and recurring 
plot lines that get recast with different characters and settings (or, in biology, where the mixing 
and matching of only four DNA molecules produce the enormous variety of living things from 
daisies to dinosaurs), these building blocks (archetypes) are common to a very large variety of 
systems and phenomena revealing an elegant simplicity underlying the complexity of systems. 
The following archetypes have been identified as potentially useful for modeling the 
drivers of conflict and convergence. The archetypes were modeled to present a more accurate 
description of the nuances of each domain, but it is useful to review the basics of each archetype 
in the abstract before they are modified for the specific research problem. The definitions of each 
archetype are taken from (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith 1994). The archetypes are 
presented in increasing order of complexity. 
a. Escalation  
An escalation archetype is a reinforcing loop. The Escalation archetype occurs when one 
party’s actions are perceived by another party to be a threat, and the second party responds in a 
similar manner, further increasing the threat. It hypothesizes that the interactions will create a 




b. Limits to Growth  
The Limits to Growth archetype is used to model scenarios where a growth process (a set 
of activities conducted in pursuit of a goal) is counteracted by a limiting process (some constraint 
on the potential performance which can be obtained by the activities conducted in the growth 
process. This limiting process can be either external or internal to the system, it is only important 
that it counteract the otherwise uninhibited growth process. In systems dynamics terms, the 
Limits to Growth archetype is defined by a reinforcing loop connected to a balancing loop. A 
useful example of an external limiting process is fishing, a growth process (where an increase in 
the number of fisherman should result in unlimited increases to the number of fish caught) which 
is counteracted by a limiting process (the reproductive capacity of the fish).  
c. Shifting the Burden  
The Shifting the Burden archetype is used to model scenarios where a problem is 
attempting to be solved by curing or correcting the symptoms instead of the root cause(s). These 
two processes (problem and symptom-correcting) may be balanced initially but often the 
symptom-correcting process has unintended side-effects that may create an addiction loop where 
the fix is actually feeding the root cause of the problem. In systems dynamics terms, the Shifting 
the Burden archetype is defined by two connected balancing loops (with normally the symptom-
correcting process quicker than the problem process) with one or more reinforcing loops from 
the symptom to the problem root cause. A useful example is ‘crisis heroism’ in business where 
normal procedures are bypassed to ‘do whatever it takes’ to succeed in a product roll-out. That 
hero is rewarded by management therefore more normal procedures are bypassed for the next 
product roll-out to get better results and the business gets addicted to the quick fixes at the 
expense of making fundamental long-term adjustments to normal procedures. 
d. Tragedy of the Commons  
The Tragedy of the Commons archetype is used to model scenarios where individual 
actors are each incentivized to consume a common resource (the “Commons”) which is unable to 
support such a large level of demand (often it is nonrenewable or replenishment is delayed). The 
value of that resource is subsequently reduced and thereby the gains realized by each actor are 
reduced (and may eventually crash). The most widely used example of tragedy of the commons 
is a large fishery, where many fishermen must share a common population of fish, which will 
decrease as the level of fishing increases. 
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e. Accidental Adversaries  
The Accidental Adversaries archetype is used to model scenarios in which two actors 
who want to be in partnership and who ought to be in partnership end up in opposition by taking 
actions that result in tension and resentment. Each actor recognizes that it is possible to support 
the other (and sometimes will) but, in an attempt to maximize utility, independently pursues 
solutions that are unintentionally obstructive to the counterpart’s success (Senge, Kleiner, 
Roberts, Ross, and Smith 1994, 147). 
The causal loop diagrams for the economic and commerce, energy and resources, and 
defense and military aspects are summarized as the major basis for the model. 
D. ECONOMY AND COMMERCE NON-LINEAR SYSTEMS DYNAMICS 
Economic and Commerce trends are a major component of the overall Asia-Pacific 
Conflict and Convergence Model. Note that the Economy and Commerce sub-model directly 
feeds Domestic Political and Social Stability, Defense Spending and Military Capabilities, and 
Foreign Policy Ambitions and Behavior. Accordingly, proper modeling of the economic 
interrelationships between actors in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to capturing potential drivers 
of conflict and convergence in the region. Figure 4 presents a high level overview of the 
Economy and Commerce relationships between the United States and China. Additional nations 
could be added as a follow on effort to this project after the accuracy of the model is 
demonstrated. The structure of those models will most likely be similar. Data came from various 
SMA reports and was supplemented by data from the International Monetary Fund and World 




Figure 4. Economic Relationships Causal Loop Diagram 
Figure 4 is necessarily rather complex and is better understood by isolating various 
components and rebuilding the overall model. The simplest possible deconstruction of the 
economic relationship between the United States and China is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Economic Relationships Isolated Escalation Loop 
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Figure 5 demonstrates that the economic relationship between the United States and 
China, if considered in isolation, would result in uninhibited economic growth (a large 
reinforcing loop). As the United States imports from China, the Chinese capital stock increases. 
As the Chinese capital stock increases, they increase their imports from the United States. The 
United States capital stock increases as the United States exports more to China. As the U.S. 
capital stock increases, the U.S. imports more from China. Although the model is rather 
simplistic (see shortcoming mentioned previously), the model serves to illustrate that, considered 
in isolation, both the United States and China have an incentive to support the economic success 
of the other country. The economic situation is complicated, but not degraded, by the addition of 
internal production as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Economic Relationships Addition of Production 
The addition of internal production, both within the United States and China, simply adds 
two additional reinforcing loops. Internal production increases a country’s capital stock, which in 
turn increases internal production. In such a scenario, capital stock would grow infinitely. Figure 
7 shows the addition of internal consumption to the model which serves as a limit to that growth, 




Figure 7. Economic Relationships Addition of Consumption 
The addition of consumption serves to balance the increase in capital stock caused by 
internal production and export. Notice that Production and Consumption form a Limit to Growth 
Archetype for capital stock. As capital stock increases (via export and production) consumption 
also increases. However, as consumption increases, capital stock decreases. This serves as the 
first limit to economic growth. The introduction of additional foreign trade introduces 
competition and a second limit to economic growth (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Economic Relationships Addition of Foreign Trade 
Figure 8 highlights the main reasons that economic growth cannot continue without limits. 
As a nation increases internal production, it will begin to trade with multiple nations. This trade 
with other nations will subsequently decrease the imports from the original second nation. This 
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will subsequently reduce the second nation’s capital stock. The United States may not be directly 
trying to reduce China’s capital stock, but by acting independently to improve its own results it is 
unintentionally obstructive to China’s goals. This is a major source of friction between the 
United States and China. Figure 9 introduces a linkage to the availability of resources, which 
serves as a further limit to each nation’s capital stock. 
 
Figure 9. Economic Relationships Addition of Resources 
It is now evident why development of an accurate Energy and Resources sub-model is 
vital to the development of large systems dynamics model of conflict and convergence in the 
Asia-Pacific region. A reduced availability of internal resources in China will result in decreased 
internal production. That decrease in internal production may result in an increase in imports 
from other nations, which results in a decrease in China’s capital stock. Similarly, an increase in 
resource availability may result in increased production, increased exports to other nations, and 
an increase to China’s capital stock. An accurate energy and resource model provides a clear 
input to the Economy and Commerce model, which serves as an input to Defense Spending & 
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Military Capabilities, Foreign Policy Ambitions & Behavior, and Domestic Political & Social 
Stability. 
Note that the goal of this effort was not to develop a macroeconomic model that forecasts 
the level of economic activity over the next 25 years. Rather, the goal was to build a model that 
is capable of representing the major economic drivers of conflict and convergence and, more 
importantly, their interactions with resource availability, energy consumption, policy, etc. 
Accordingly, existing macroeconomic models may be used to validate the economic systems 
dynamics model. Finally, it is important to note that two major changes to the model could be 
addressed in future follow on iterations: 
1. The assumption that an increase in capital stock results in an increase in Imports is 
too simplistic. The overall behavior is correct, but the causes need to be identified 
more clearly. 
2. The addition of a “Monetary Authority” will be vital to the proper behavior of the 
model. The Chinese decision to couple the value of the Yuan to the dollar must be 
modeled (as well as the recent pressures to decouple the currencies) 
E. ENERGY AND RESOURCES NON-LINEAR SYSTEMS DYNAMICS 
Energy and resource consumption are key contributors to the overall PACOM SMA 
systems dynamics model. Although they do not directly contribute to potentially escalating 
regional tension and potential conflict, they are key indicators of potential stressors in the SD 
model. Additionally, outputs from the energy and resource consumption mechanisms input 
directly into the other non-linear dynamics of the economy, social stability, and emerging 
technologies that directly affect the regional tension and potential conflict model.  
The energy consumption model for the PACOM SMA encompasses commonly used and 
globally traded energy resource supplies that are utilized to produce energy including oil, coal, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), nuclear, hydroelectric, and other renewables such as wind, solar and 
tidal. In addition, demand for energy is aggregated into a total whether it is for the population’s 
usage or production regardless of the reason for that consumption (agriculture, manufacturing, 
transportation, etc.).  
Historical information as well as emerging supply and demand trends on energy both for 
the region and China was used to base the model. Information compiled from the United States 
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Energy Information Administration (USEIA) was the primary source data along with open 
source trade publications.  
The energy consumption SD model is a Shifting-the-Burden Casual Loop Archetype with 
two addiction loops, as illustrated in Figure 10. This model archetype highlights the balancing 
loops where China is attempting to manage its various energy supply sources and internal 
demands. However, there are also two reinforcing loops that degrade the system’s balance where 
increasing economic activity and energy consumption as a percentage of the available supply at 
any time drive further energy production for additional consumption. Note that the slashed lines 
on several of the arcs indicate a delay. 
 
Figure 10. PACOM Energy Consumption Causal Loop Diagram 
The following will explain Figure 10 model’s features starting in the upper right corner 
with population growth and proceed clockwise. The explanation will only refer to China within 
the model but future versions of this model will include multiple PACOM states’ supply and 
demand activities to eventually encompass the PACOM region. This modeling approach allows 
the outputs to be scalable to view an individual state’s dynamics or the entire PACOM region as 
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a whole. Energy production and consumption is quantified in quadrillion British Thermal Units 
(BTUs) that USEIA utilizes in macro-economic analysis.  
1. Population and Demographic Shift: As China’s expected population grows and 
potentially shifts from rural to urban and more people as a percentage of the state’s 
population leave poverty the population demand for energy will increase (The World 
Bank Group 2014). This will increase China’s total energy demand. The balancing 
loop takes into account government policies that limit unchecked population growth 
as well as other limitations such as access to fresh water.  
2. Economic Growth: This value is supplied as an output from the Economy & 
Commerce model. Acting upon it is population growth, after a delay, and China’s 
balancing loop that takes into account government policies that limit unchecked 
economic growth as well as potentially limiting factors such as resources other than 
energy like rare earth elements (REE) or delayed access to emerging technologies. 
Economic growth over the timeframe will increase economic activity demand for 
energy and fuel the expansion of China’s overall internal energy consumption. This 
forms one of the addiction loops as economic growth drives more internal energy 
production, after a delay, to capitalize on increasing energy demand.  
3. China’s internal energy resource and production capability was aggregated to two 
casual relationships: hydro-carbon production including oil, coal, and LNG; and non-
hydrocarbon including nuclear, hydro-electric and other renewable sources (USEIA 
2014). While China currently has balancing policy inputs on hydro-carbon production 
due to environmental impacts, renewables are actually reinforced by government 
policies to expand their percentage of the energy market (Chinese Academy of Social 
Science 2012). Together they form China’s internal energy production capacity.  
4. As China is currently a net energy importer, energy imports are accounted for in 
terms of hydro-carbon and non-hydro-carbon (USEIA 2014). It is necessary to break 
these out as China attempts to control hydro-carbon energy imports and mitigate 
unchecked dependence on hydro-carbon imports (Tu et al. 2012). Both internal and 
imported energy form the total energy supply available to China. If there is excess, 
then the exporting of that energy is accounted for in the economic activity demand.  
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5. Both energy supply and demand are the inputs to the state of energy consumption 
both for China and scalable eventually to the entire PACOM region. This is the 
source of the second addiction loop that as the demand nears the total available 
supply, prices rise on the global markets and there is a delayed reaction toward the 
increase in supply of energy available (Finley 2014).  
The following outputs could be viewed independently for analysis or utilized as inputs in 
other portions of the PACOM SMA SD Model over the specified timeframe:  
1. As the state of energy consumption margin decreases and global energy market prices 
increase, this would be a negative input into the economy and commerce model.  
2. The amount of internal hydro-carbon production has a balancing influence on 
domestic political and social stability. As production increases, harmful effects on the 
environment have a negative impact to the social contract the Chinese government 
has with its people.  
3. The percentage of internal energy production to imported energy is an input to 
foreign policy. The pressure on China to import more energy to remain globally 
competitive has an effect on foreign policy decisions. This can also act as a driver to 
secure energy resources abroad to make up the gap in state energy demand and 
internal energy production.  
4. China’s energy capacity and portfolio both independently and as a part of the region 
over the timeframe to see indicators of dependent relationships.  
F. DEFENSE AND MILITARY NON-LINEAR SYSTEMS DYNAMICS 
The tension module is based on an escalation archetype. The escalation archetype is 
based on two competing players taking actions to balance the actions of the other player. These 
reinforcing actions continue to escalate a system until one or both of the parties are eliminated or 
change their goals. In this particular system China and the U.S. both have goals to influence the 
East Asia region. China’s goals stem from their belief that ancient historical boundaries entitle 
them to exercise sovereignty over certain territories. The U.S.’s goals stem from the many 
alliances that they have in the region which in some instances obligate them to military action. 
There are also economic drivers for both of these nations that drive the desire to maintain 
influence in the region, and these actions are modeled in the economic and energy modules. With 
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regards to the tension module, the assumption is that China and the U.S. will take military action 
to gain influence in the region.  
The causal loop shown in Figure 11 can be illustrated using the Senkaku islands as an 
example scenario. One can start with the Japanese government’s attempt to purchase the islands 
from a private Japanese owner (Harper 2013). This economic move forced China to 
acknowledge whether or not the islands were owned by the Japanese. Acknowledging this action 
would give the perception that the United States and its ally had a greater influence in the region. 
This corresponds to the causal loop element stating that China perceives the U.S. or U.S. ally has 
a greater influence in East Asia. This caused China to take action in the form of sea and air 
defense identification zones to state that they did not recognize Japanese ownership, and further 
state that China had sovereignty over the territory. This action in China’s mind gave them greater 
influence in the region. As seen in Figure 11, there is a delay between China’s influence and the 
U.S. perception of China’s influence. If the U.S. perceives China’s actions as giving them a 
greater influence in the region then they will take military action. 
In this particular instance, the U.S. military made a strategic shift to pivot to the Pacific. 
They also sent military ships and aircraft through the identification zone to state that they did not 
Tension Causal Loop Diagram
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Figure 11. PACOM Tension Causal Loop Diagram 
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recognize China’s authority in the region. The military action of China’s establishment of the air 
defense identification zone and the U.S. response both contributed to increased tensions between 
China and the United States, which is illustrated in the causal loop diagram. At the present time, 
China has not taken direct action against vessels violating the identification zone. They are 
taking indirect actions like increasing their Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capability and 
increasing their defense spending to facilitate possible direct actions in the future.  
Tensions will continue to increase unless a situation arises that allow the militaries of 
China and the U.S. to cooperate. Examples of this occur in joint exercises conducted to combat 
piracy as well as joint exercises to aide nations that encounter natural disasters. These 
peacekeeping actions will lower tensions temporarily but the tension problem will not be solved 
completely through military means. There must be some economic or other contributions that 
lead to a consistent downward trend of tension.  
The Senkaku island dispute is an example of a scenario that follows the escalation 
archetype. There are several other military actions that will lead to scenarios that are similar to 
the Senkaku islands and these actions can be modeled using the causal framework described 
above. Examples of military actions that can be modeled by this tension module are (Carnegie 
2014):  
1. Increase in Defense spending above a certain threshold by China, U.S., or ally.  
2. Disputes involving military vessels between China and U.S. or China ally and U.S. 
ally.  
3. Declaration of exclusion zone in international sea space using military vessels as 
enforcement.  
4. Introduction of new militarily significant technology. 
5. Military occupation of disputed territory.  
6. Nuclear proliferation issues.  
7. Official visits by high profile U.S. political figures to U.S. allies in the Pacific.  
8. Official visits by high profile Chinese political figures to China allies in the Pacific.  
9. China’s actions in North Korea.  
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10. Cybersecurity.  
The primary source of information for these variables was the Carnegie study as well as 
the article entitled “China’s Three Warfares”.  
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III. INPUT REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
NPS used PACOM project participant products within a systems dynamics context in 
support of model building efforts. What follows is a brief overview of these products and their 
relation to NPS’s systems dynamics model. Elements of divergence and correspondence between 
these products and the model are noted. 
B. CSIS DELIVERABLES I, II, AND III 
CSIS provided three deliverables in support of this SMA. Each deliverable respectively 
addressed priority questions one through three. 
CSIS Deliverable One addressed SMA priority one questions, broadly categorized as 
requirements for theater engagement. Within this context, CSIS examined historical growth 
patterns and demographic patterns of both China and the US. There is a high degree of 
correspondence between those researched by CSIS and those used in the NPS model. 
Additionally, NPS instantiated CSIS’s conclusion that relations between China and the U.S. 
depend not only on each country’s perception of the other’s influence, but also on each country’s 
perception of their own influence. 
Deliverable Two addressed SMA priority two questions, generally identifying 
opportunities of cooperation with emerging partners in the Asia-Pacific region. Emerging energy 
patterns, demographics, and sources correlate closely with those used to build NPS’s systems 
dynamic model. CSIS also identifies potential cooperation avenues. NPS’s model, however, 
creates general categories of cooperation and conflict, leaving the model user to identify 
specifics. Additionally, both products caution against reliance on future predictions. 
Emergent technologies and U.S. strategy (linking ways and means) in the Asia-Pacific 
region were addressed in CSIS’s Deliverable Three. While less tangible than the previous two 
deliverables, topics in this report were included in the NPS model via potential events. However, 
no direct input for technology or strategy was included. 
C. TAMU 
TAMU’s report provides analysis of open source media and understanding of key cultural 
scripts and paradigms within Chinese culture. While not directly included within the model, 
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TAMU’s report provides invaluable reference to key cultural drivers and insight to potential 
political unrest within China. 
D. NSI 
NSI provided modeling review and feedback to ensure verification and completeness. 
Additionally, NSI provided analysis of points of congruence and incongruence between the NPS 
model and other participants with respect to model assumptions and hypotheses. Their 
Integration Report: ICONS Overview, February 20, 2015, provides a concise summary of the 
efforts of all of the collaborator findings. 
E. MONITOR 360 
Monitor 360’s report combines its Futures Analysis methodology with insights from 
SMEs to explore how internal dynamics in China could drive shifts in the geostrategic 
environment of the East China Sea. It focuses on internal dynamics and provides de-escalation 
objectives and considerations that can inform PACOM efforts to preempt, shape, or de-escalate 
rising tensions. Further, this report presents a series of gradual change and escalatory pathways 
in U.S.– China relations. While these projected pathways are not incorporated directly into the 
NPS model, certain aspects of the report are included within the Chinese Protestor, Domestic 
Political, and Defense and Military sub-models. These aspects include economic growth using 
historical data and SME projections, potential domestic unrest using a disease transmission 
model, and potential military incidents using a tension and perception model. 
F. START 
START’s mid-term deliverable provides a review of current team deliverable from 
Monitor 360, CSIS, TAMU, CEIP, and START. START’s effort was invaluable in collating 
team inputs into the model.  
Further, START’s mid-term deliverable, Empirical Assessments of the Sources of 
Conflict and Cooperation in PACOM AOR, provided numerical correlation to establish potential 
sources of feedback within the Defense and Military sub-model, to include those from 
surrounding nations. 
G. CEIP 
CEIP provided variable identification and database collection which helped greatly with 
narrowing inputs to the model to a manageable level. Key indicators identified by CEIP, such as 
energy imports and flashpoints, are directly included in the economic and military models. 
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Additionally, CEIP provided review and verification of model input. Discussion generated 
during CEIP’s review of the economic, military, and resource sub-models led to changes within 
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IV. SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODELS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section describes each of the major sub-models and results obtained from each. 
Additionally, these sub-models are integrated into a single encompassing model with resulting 
analysis described. 
B. MODEL DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
1. Energy Demand and Resources Sub-Model 
China’s demand for energy and resulting energy resources consumption potentially 
contributes to escalating regional tension and conflict (McKinsey 2014). Dynamic relationships 
in China’s internal demand for energy along with the sources of the energy resources consumed 
to meet that demand are indicators of potential stressors in the overall PACOM SMA SD model. 
Additionally, interactions with the economic and social stability models affect the overall 
regional tension and potential conflict model. 
Most historical trend and resources data are from the 1980s to 2012, the last full year 
available that was published openly. Where possible, current energy related inputs up to 
September 2014 were utilized, including agreements such as the 2014 Russian-Chinese 
agreement implementing additional Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) pipelines from Russian 
reserves to China. 
The USEIA was the primary source for historical and projected worldwide and Chinese-
specific energy demand and resource consumption trends. Whenever reference data conflicted, 
USEIA data was utilized as the tie-breaker and quality assurance check. Other key information 
and trend references are included in the report reference section. 
Energy demand, resources and consumption rates were standardized to quadrillion (1015) 
of British Thermal Units (BTUs) annually to allow all demand drivers and resources to be 
dynamically related on an equivalent scale. 
Assumptions: 
Utilizing historical data as well as state and energy industry projections, the following 




i. No energy related transformational technology will be significantly fielded in 
the next 25 years 
a. Although research continues on technologies such as fusion nuclear 
reactors and wireless energy transmission, the model assumes those 
technologies will not be fielded commercially or encompass greater 
than 1-2% of the annual Chinese energy portfolio in the 25 year 
timeframe (Xu 2014). 
b. New technologies being fielded, improved and becoming more cost 
competitive such wind turbines, biomass renewables and shale gas 
drilling are accounted for in the model and part of the reason those 
energy resources expand over the next 25 years. 
ii. The baseline energy model does not account for dramatic geo-political actions 
such as a politically motivated embargo of energy resources by export states 
or blockade of China’s energy resource imports due to war. The baseline 
energy model is meant to account for events up to, but not including, war. 
iii. The effect of the global cost of energy is resident in the Economic SD model. 
Should economic conditions indicate an economic recession, depression, or 
multi-year spike in economic growth, those effects will translate to the energy 
demand and energy resources consumption relationships but are not resident 
in the baseline energy model itself. 
iv. China will continue energy demand and resource trends in the following 
areas: 
a. Limit internal coal mining growth and scale back consumption, using 
increasing coal imports to fill the demand gap in current coal-powered 
energy systems (Tu et al. 2012). 
b. Continue to favor importing energy resources over attempts to meet 
internal environmental goals (McKinsey 2014). 
c. Continue to incentivize population urbanization and reducing average 
household size and energy usage per household. This trend is currently 
forecast to continue through 2035 (Karplus 2014).. 
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d. Continue to stress and incentivize non-industrial economic ventures 
that utilize fewer energy resources over heavy-industrial economic 
ventures that utilize more energy resources for the equivalent 
economic activity (Tu et al. 2012). 
e. Chinese macro-economic growth rate will taper off from the last 
decade’s 8-10% annualized growth to a reduced and sustainable 4-6% 
annualized growth. However, with this reduction in macro-economic 
growth there will be a net increase in internal consumption of energy 
intensive technology such as expanding vehicle use per household and 
number of personal electronic devices per person (Monitor360 2014). 
a. Chinese Energy Demand and Energy Resources Consumption Model 
Discussion: 
Figure 12 is a graphical depiction of the overall iThink 10.0.6 SD model for China’s 
energy demand and energy resources consumption. The following sections discuss the model and 
key interactions in more detail. 
 
Figure 12. China’s Energy Demand and Energy Resources Consumption Model 
 
Figure 13 shows China’s energy demand modeled in the following three categories:  
• Household Energy Demand: the population’s demand for energy annualized. 
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• Heavy Industry Energy Demand: The economy’s demand for energy to support 
construction, mining, commercial transportation, traditional manufacturing, etc. The 
majority of Chinese military energy demand falls into this category. 
• Non-Industrial Energy Demand: The economy’s demand for energy to support 
information technologies, office buildings, education facilities, health care facilities, etc. 
The majority of Chinese state government energy demand falls into this category with the 
exception of state owned heavy industrial companies. 
 
Figure 13. China’s Energy Demand Section of the SD Model 
Baseline Chinese household energy demand takes into account both the forecast number 
of households in China as well as the forecast energy demand per household. 
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• The number of Chinese households is forecast to increase in 25 years from approximately 
430 million to a little over 500 million (The World Bank Group 2012). This is due to 
both projected population increase and decreasing average Chinese household size. 
Household size is decreasing due to a combination of Chinese incentives promoting 
urbanization, reduced number of children per couple, and a growing middle class which 
tends to have fewer children per household. 
• Chinese household energy demand per household is forecast to decrease from 2015 to 
2040 due to a combination of factors, including a reduced number of persons per 
household, more energy efficient buildings, and planned upgrades to energy 
transmission infrastructure. China’s per household energy demand would actually be 
lower by 2040 due to the above factors but they are partially offset by forecast energy 
demand increases due to greater personal vehicle usage and more personal electronic 
devices per person (Monitor360 2014). 
The baseline Chinese heavy industry and non-industrial energy demand model shows 
significant changes based on economic trends and China’s state policy decisions (Karplus 2014). 
China’s non-industrial energy demand will make up a greater percentage of its overall energy 
demand through 2040 at an increasing rate. Population urbanization (expected to remain a factor 
through 2035) and expansion of its information technology economy are the primary factors 
driving this growth in the timeframe. It’s growth significantly curtails from 2025-2030 due to 
decreasing rates of construction and state policy decisions made to cap heavy industry growth 
due to internal economic and environmental sustainability reasons. 
As a result of the above, the baseline model shows Chinese energy demand nearly 
doubling in 25 years from 120 to 220 quadrillion BTUs annually. The rate of growth, however, is 
constantly decreasing. China’s energy demand will change significantly where non-industrial 
energy demand will overtake household demand and make-up a larger percentage of overall 
energy demand. This change will have an effect on the types of energy resources consumed 
required to satisfy demand through 2040 in the baseline model. The overall Chinese baseline 
energy demand model results from 2015 to 2040 are graphically illustrated in Figure 14 and 























b. China’s Energy Resources Consumption Discussion: 
China’s energy resources consumption was analyzed and modeled in the following four 
categories. These are graphically illustrated with their relationships in the SD consumption 
model in Figure 15 
1. Coal: Broken down by amount imported and domestically produced (USGS 2012). 
2. Oil: Primary liquid crude, broken down by amount imported and domestically produced 
(Ross 2013). 
3. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG): Broken down by 
amount imported primarily by sea through the PACOM AOR and by existing or planned 
pipelines from the 2014 Russian-Chinese LNG-LPG agreement and domestically 
produced (British Petroleum 2013). 
4. Nuclear-Hydroelectric-Renewables (NHR): Broken down by domestic nuclear 
production, hydro-electric production, and renewables to include solar, wind and biomass 
production (USEIA 2014). 
 
Figure 15. China’s Energy Resources and Consumption Section of the SD Model 
 
The baseline energy resources and consumption model takes into account the following trends 
and forecast changes: 
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Coal: Although China has the second largest proven coal reserves in the world, only 
behind the United States, the state is actively limiting expansion of internal mining operations 
and gradually converting coal powered energy systems to other resources, primarily oil or LNG-
LPG (USGS 2012). China has recently begun importing coal and that trend is forecast to increase 
(Tu et al. 2012). Although China is limiting domestic coal resource mining due to a variety of 
reasons, coal driven energy systems are not converting as fast due to large investment capital 
required. This leaves a gap that is being met by imported coal. That gap is forecast to increase in 
the near term as China has stated goals of reducing coal as its primary energy resource from 60-
65% of all resources consumed to 50-55% by 2040 as a percentage of energy resources 
consumed (USEIA 2014). 
Oil: China has fairly limited proven domestic reserves of oil compared to the size of its 
economy (USEIA 2014). As domestic inland growth of crude oil drilling is limited, crude oil 
imports are expected to triple over the next 25 years, with delivery routes primarily by sea 
through the PACOM AOR. This is one of the drivers for China to secure energy resource rights 
near its shores by the nine-dashed line. This is also a reason why domestic construction of oil 
tankers has increased, oil pipelines from Myanmar have expanded, and been a stated reason for 
increase in the size, capability and reach of the PLAN to protect energy related economic 
interests abroad (Monitor360 2014). 
LNG-LPG: Several state documents and articles show a relatively recent emphasis on 
expanding LNG-LPG consumption due to its relatively environmentally cleanliness compared to 
coal and oil (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 2013). However, unlike the United States, the 
majority of known Chinese domestic gas reserves are not as economically feasible extract due to 
geological formation differences (USGS 2012). Those two drivers are leading to a forecast 
increase imported LNG-LPG either by sea through the PACOM AOR or through interior 
pipelines. Chinese LNG-LPG consumption is forecast to expand over four times in the next 25 
years, primarily being limited by the speed of infrastructure construction. 
NHR: Domestic nuclear energy production will continue to increase as more reactors 
come online, however growth is being limited by the state (USEIA 2014). After recent incidents 
such as Fukushima, Japan, China placed a temporary nuclear building freeze as permitting and 
safety standards were increased. Although construction rates have resumed, there is forecast a 
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temporary reversal in the growth of nuclear generated power available from 2031-2035. 
Domestic hydroelectric production of energy is forecast to steadily increase as new power 
generating facilities come online and legacy facilities are expanded or made more efficient. 
However, this internal resource is considered near capacity due to environmental considerations 
and little excess growth potential is available. Renewable energy resources, primarily in the solar, 
wind, and biomass, will see the largest growth. Renewable energy infrastructure is being 
considerably subsidized to spur growth and state policies are incentivizing it to investors. 
Renewable energy resources are forecast to increase ten times in the next 25 years (Xu et al. 
2014). They have additional potential should current economic trends continue and construction 
and operating costs come down. Despite this forecast growth, renewables will only make-up 5% 
of energy resource consumption by 2040 in the baseline model. 
The resulting overall Chinese baseline energy resource and consumption model results 
from 2015 to 2040 are graphically illustrated in Figure 16. They are listed by category in Table 2. 
 
















Table 2. Chinese Baseline Model Energy Resources Consumption Table from 2015-2040 
 
c. Modeling Linkages 
As mentioned, the model results above are a based on historical data and forecast 
trends for the next 25 years in energy. Links between the Energy SD model directly to the 
tension, social stability and economic models shall provide inputs to them as well as taking 
outputs dynamically from them. 
Economy: Should the economic model show a rapid decrease in activity 
indicating recession or depression, there will be corresponding decreases in demand and lagging 
decreases in the amount of energy resources imported. Should the slowdown be deep and long, 
eventually domestic energy resource consumption will reduce as well. Should China’s economy 
heat up beyond projections, demand will increase and initially available imports will spike to 
meet demand until domestic production catches up. 
Social Stability: Domestically mined coal, oil and LNG-LPG as well as 
their consumption produce a negative environmental effect, pollution and reduced standard of 
living, on the population potentially leading to instability. This relationship is one driver why 
China’s domestic coal mining is being artificially limited (USEIA 2014). The amount of 
domestic negative environmental damage from energy resource mining and consumption shall 
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feed into the social stability model and potentially social stability outputs could lead to further 
caps on domestic mining. 
Tension: Should a military or destabilizing action interfere with Chinese 
energy demand or energy imports, the energy model will show spikes or dips in the appropriate 
activities. Additionally, the amount of energy China imports as a percentage of its overall 
demand can increase tension. As China becomes more reliant on external sources of energy to 
meet its economic goals, the state perceives more risk to its energy import activities by other 
nations. That risk is one driver why China is looking to expand its near off-shore influence and 
control as well as expand the reach of the PLAN to protect vital energy import sea lanes. 
d. Potential Key Relationships for PACOM Planners: 
Two examples of potential key relationships with regard to Chinese energy 
demand and resource consumption are provided in the baseline model. 
First is the percentage of energy resources consumed from domestic 
environmentally-damaging sources such as coal, oil, and LNG-LPG with respect to China’s 
overall total energy resource consumption. The higher the percentage, the more potential damage 
might be done to China’s environment. This is a factor which is at least partially driving China’s 
state policy to limit domestic coal and oil extraction as well as incentivize conversion to 
renewable energy resource consumption. 
The baseline model graphically illustrates in Figure 17 and in Table 3 the 
projected percentage of environmentally damaging energy resource consumption compared to 
entire Chinese energy resource consumption. If state policy and forecasts hold, China will reduce 
consumption of environmentally damaging energy resources considerably. This should allow the 
state to mitigate harm done to the local environment over time. However, should events from 
other models such as a ‘third party destabilizing event’ preclude conversion to renewables or 
limit imports, China will potentially extract more domestic environmentally-damaging resources, 




Figure 17. Chinese Baseline Model Environmental Damage and Energy Import Risk 
Chart from 2015 -2040 
 
 
Table 3. Chinese Baseline Model Environmental Damage and Energy Import Risk 






Second is the percentage of Chinese energy resources consumed that are imported 
through the PACOM AOR, primarily by sea. Historically this has not been a high percentage of 
the overall Chinese energy portfolio but as the economy has dramatically increased in the last 
decade-plus, so has this percentage. Forecasts indicate the percentage will increase as Chinese 
state policy limits domestic mining but has economic growth projections that exceed internal 
energy resources. The baseline energy model reflects that. This is one of the drivers for China to 
secure more energy resource rights near its shores by the nine-dashed line. This is also a stated 
reason for increase in the size, capability and reach of the PLAN to protect energy related 
economic interests abroad. As the percentage of required energy is imported the potential is that 
tension will rise as China seeks to secure those resources.  
2. Economic Sub-Model 
Economics and commerce play a key role in the relationships among the US, the PRC, 
and other nations in the PACOM AOR. While the current sub-model focuses on the dynamics of 
the US-PRC economic relationship, the model can be extended to include other bilateral 
relationship dynamics as well. 
a. Economic Sub-Model Discussion: 
The Economic Sub-Model is shown in Figure 18. The Economic Sub-Model 
directly contributes to potentially escalating regional tension and the potential for conflict. The 
sub-model was developed using open source trend and proven resources model data provided by 
the United Nations for 2012. All the economic data was converted to 2012 U.S .dollars for 
comparison purposes. Other data sources (e.g. the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank) 
were considered for inclusion but ultimately not used at this time. The UN economic data was 
used with a statistics package curve-fitting application to generate equations that reflect the real 
world U.S. and PRC economic indicators through 2012. Figures 19 through 22 compare the US 





Figure 18. PACOM SMA Economic Sub-Model 
 
Figure 19.  US Total Consumption, Household Consumption, and Government 




Figure 20. PRC Total Consumption, Household Consumption, and Government 
Expenditure by Year 
 
 
Figure 21. US Non-defense Spending, Defense Spending, and Gross Capital 





Figure 22. PRC Non-defense Spending, Defense Spending, and Gross Capital 
Formation by Year 
Currently, users of the economic model cannot alter the pre-established expected 
growth equations for individual economic component; however, users can control the 
multiplying coefficients to examine the potential impact of growth/decline for individual 
economic component 
b. Assumptions:  
The economic sub-model assumes that the U.S.-China economic relationship will 
continue for the foreseeable future to be one of mutual benefit, albeit with competitive aspects. 
3. Tension Sub-Model 
 Tension is the metric that is used to illustrate the probability of conflict or 
convergence occurring in the defense and military model. High tension levels suggest that 
conflict is likely to occur while lower tension levels indicate that the nations involved are 
pursuing normal diplomatic relations. 
a. Tension Model Discussion: 
The defense and military tension model appears in Figure 23. The tension model 
is driven by perceptions and desires of influence in the region. The Chinese have a perception of 
their influence in the region and a perception of the United States’ influence in the region. The 
Chinese also have a desired level of influence the region and an assumed goal of limiting other 
nations influence in the region. If the Chinese desired influence is less than their perceived 
influence then the Chinese will take action to close the gap between their perceived influence 
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and their desired influence in the region. Similarly, if the Chinese perceive a difference between 
their perceived level of U.S. influence in the region and their desired U.S. influence, this will 
likely lead to actions to counter the perceived deficit. 
 
Figure 23. Tension Sub-Model 
From a United States perspective the model works in the same manner. The U.S. will 
take influencing actions if their desired influence is lower than their perceived influence, or if 
China’s perceived influence in the region is higher than the desired level of Chinese influence. 
From a military perspective, these influencing actions will likely come from one of the five 
possible categories of military scenarios. These are explained in more detail in the following 
sections. 
Stabilizing actions will likely come in the form of economic cooperation through trading 
and investing. Military cooperation is also possible through joint exercises, disaster relief, and 
counter-piracy operations.  
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b.  Assumptions: 
(1)  This model assumes that China and the U.S. will combine to account 
for 100% of influence in the Pacific region. Future model developments will consider other 
nations perceptions of influence within the region. 
(2)  The model receives input from subject matter experts on the tension 
unit increase for each military action and assumes these opinions are correct. 
(3)  Tension levels that indicate a high probability of conflict or a high 
probability of cooperation must be determined through discussions with subject matter experts. 
4. Military Actions Sub-Model 
As stated previously, the U.S. currently has the predominant influence in the Pacific 
region. China will likely take actions over the next 25 years to limit U.S. influence and freedom 
of action in the region. Based on conversations with subject matter experts at CEIP, START and 
Monitor 360, five categories of military actions were developed. These actions are considered to 
be destabilizing actions that increase tension as seen in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Tension Model with Military Actions 
Unintentional Quasi-Military Actions. 
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 An example of an unintentional action is a collision at sea by a Chinese vessel and one 
from a U.S. or allied nation. This situation could potentially escalate depending on the actions of 
the local actors involved. In the past, these situations have raised tensions but usually are 
resolved through discussions between leaders of both governments.  
Intentional Quasi-Military Actions.  
An example of an intentional quasi-military action would be the establishment of an 
exclusion zone by China. Usually the purpose of this would be to gauge the resolve of the 
opposing nation. In the example of the most recent exclusion zone established by China, the U.S. 
and Japan responded with their quasi-military action of continuing to send aircraft or ships 
through the zone. These incidents have the potential to escalate based on the resolve of each 
nation. When China set up the exclusion zone and the U.S. and Japan sent fighters through the 
zone, China scrambled jets but did not escalate the situation further.   
Conflict Over Taiwan:  
This is the least likely but also the most dangerous scenario. This will bring tensions to 
the highest levels and likely lead to war if the situation isn’t balanced by a stabilizing action. An 
example of this would be if the Chinese government loses patience with the continued sale of 
U.S. arms to Taiwan, or if the U.S. gives Taiwan a new technology that significantly increases 
Taiwan’s defense capabilities. This could cause the Chinese to respond with an aggressive 
military action.  
Conflict Over North Korea. 
 Currently, China has publicly condemned North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
However, a change in rhetoric by North Korea, such as the threat of collapse, could alter China’s 
policy toward North Korea. It could cause China to change its stance on North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions. This would likely lead to more aggressive U.S. intervention to stop nuclear 
proliferation, and this would certainly raise tensions to the highest levels. 
China or U.S. Dragged into 3rd Party Conflict. 
This is different from the 2nd category because it originates with an action initiated from 
a third party whereas the above scenario deals with a Chinese or U.S. action specifically in 
Taiwan or North Korea. An example of this would be if Japan took actions to aggressively 
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occupy South China Sea islands, and was confronted by Chinese military units. Even though the 
U.S. may not agree with Japanese actions, they could get dragged into a conflict based on their 
treaty obligations. Similarly, if North Korea’s nuclear development reaches a level that the U.S. 
perceives as dangerous, this could cause the U.S. to take action, and these actions could invoke 
the Sino-North Korean treaty obligating China to get involved. This scenario likely could be 
resolved by China and U.S. unless one of those two nations responds very aggressively to the 
third party. 
There are many events that can be grouped into one of these three categories but in 
speaking with the subject matter experts, military actions will fall into one of these three 
categories within the next 25 years. 
5. Demographics and Stability Sub-Model 
The PACOM SMA Demographics and Stability Sub-Model is a SD model intended to 
communicate the dependencies and interrelationships that affect the domestic political and social 
stability of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The iThink graphical representation of the PACOM SMA Demographics and Stability 
Sub-Model is shown in Figure 25. The description of the model’s structure, assumptions and 
limitations, inputs/outputs, and interfaces follow. 
 




In modeling either social or political stability it is necessary first to be clear or define 
what is meant by “stability”. One way of defining stability would be as the lack or relative rarity 
of instability actions or events. Note that stability doesn’t necessarily mean lack of change. 
Stability means that changes occur within a framework that does not threaten the continuation of 
the entity (Dowding and Kimber, 1983). Thus a political system can be very dynamic (e.g. the 
United States), but stable in that the changes to the political system occur within the allowed 
rules of the system (i.e. free and open elections, legislation by representatives, judicial overview 
of legislation, balance of power). 
In China, stability is a primary goal (the other being economic development) of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is a reinforcing relationship between economic 
development and political stability that has been studied extensively. In terms of external 
relations, external perception of the stability of a country affects the willingness of foreign 
investors to make direct investments in that country, thus affecting economic development. 
Greater economic development tends to promote greater internal stability. 
Several frameworks such as the NSI StaM (Stability Model) (NSI, 2014) and JPL Athena 
model (Chamberlain and Duquette, 2012) exist to help analyze and organize analysis concerning 
the stability of countries. These models help analysts define and categorize the factors that that 
effect stability. Systems dynamics can provide a further step that describes how the non-linear 
interactions between factors affect the dynamic behavior of the system (in this case, countries 
within a geographical region).  
The PACOM Demographics and Stability Sub-Model is composed of two components – 
a Chinese Demographics Sub-Model and a Protestor Sub-Model. 
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a. The Chinese Demographics Sub-Model 
Figure 26 shows the iThink graphical depiction of the Chinese Demographics 
Sub-model. A demographic model is necessary to consider when modeling potential political or 
social instability because different factors will affect different segments of the population in 
different manners. For example, if one of the factors affecting stability is the level of 
dissatisfaction with the social support mechanisms for the aged population 65 years or older, 
then that issue is more prominent when a large portion of the population is age 65+ or soon 
facing retirement. Likewise, the segment of the population most likely to participate in 
destabilizing actions as a result of dissatisfaction is adults over 18 years old. 
The population is modeled as four age groups – Children (birth through 17 years), Young 
Adults (18 through 39 years), Mid-Adults (40 through 64 years) and Seniors (65 through 99 
years). Each age group is modeled in iThink as a “conveyer belt” entity. Each conveyer belt 
consists of a number of slats, one slat for each year in the age group. Each slat is initially loaded 
with the number of individuals at that age from the 2010 census. As the simulation progresses, 
the people in each slat are moved to the next slat, simulating aging of that population cohort. 
Each conveyer belt entity allows for “leakage”, i.e. individuals that are removed from the 
conveyer belt for one reason or another. In this model, the leakage from each age group is 
 
Figure 26. Chinese Demographics Sub-Model 
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attributed to either death or migration. China currently has a net negative migration rate, which 
will probably continue during the timeframe of this study. Reliable data exist from the World 
Bank, the World Health Organization, and the Chinese government itself for statistics such as 
crude birth rate, infant and childhood mortality, and migration rate (although not by age group). 
The conveyer belt entity also allows leakage to be modeled as either linear or exponential, and 
distributed either across the entire time period or a portion of the time period. For example, the 
current settings on the Seniors allows a 99% exponential leakage (death) from 77 years (current 
average Chinese life expectancy) through 99 years old. 
(1)  Assumptions and Limitations.  
The current Chinese Demographics Sub-Model does not divide the age cohorts into male-
female components, ethnicity components, or rural-urban components. Demographers sometimes 
make such distinctions as required to support research, but with the possible exception of a rural-
urban distinction, finer classification of population groups was not necessary to support the 
Protestor Sub-Model. 
The data available for the Chinese Net Migration Rate is not given by age. Therefore the 
allocation of the rate across the four age groups was assigned subjectively. Further research into 
Chinese migration may provide more data upon which to assign the weights among the four age 
groups. 
The duration of the age groups was assigned based on the following reasoning: 
• Children Ages 0-17 – Children are still too young to take part in large scale 
political actions, or are under the control of their parents 
• Young Adults Ages 18-39 – Prime pairing and child bearing years. 
• Mid Adults Ages 40-65 – Prime career and work years. 
• Seniors Ages 65-99 – Most adults in retirement. 
(2)  Sub-Model Inputs.  
Currently the Chinese Demographics Sub-Model has a single user-controllable input 
parameter, Crude Birth Rate. The CIA World Fact Book defines crude birth rate as “… the 
average annual number of births during a year per 1,000 persons in the population at midyear…” 
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The Fact Book goes on to state, “The birth rate is usually the dominant factor in determining the 
rate of population growth. It depends on both the level of fertility and the age structure of the 
population." The slider on the iThink Interface View allows the user to select from 0 to 20 live 
births/1,000 population.  
(3)  Sub-Model Outputs.  
The Chinese Demographics Sub-Model produces a graph (Figure 27) showing the 
number of people in each age group including a Total Population over time (the current 
simulation duration, 25 years). Note the slow decline in the number of young adults, an expected 
result from the reduction in birth rates due to the One Child Policy and reduced family sizes due 
to economic pressures of transferring to more urban environments. 
(4)  Data Sources: 
Demographic data on China was drawn from the government’s 2010 Census as reported 
both on official Chinese Government web-sites and the CIA World Fact Book. Additional values 
for Crude Birth Rate, and Childhood Morality Rate were drawn from the World Health 
Organization. 
 
Figure 27. Chinese Population Projections from the Demographics Sub-Model 
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(5)  Sub-Model Interfaces.  
The Chinese Population Sub-Model has a single interface to other parts of the PACOM 
Stability Model, namely Total Adult Population. Total Adult Population defines the population 
of potential protestors available to become active protestors. 
b. The Chinese Protestor Sub-Model. 
Figure 28 shows the iThink graphical depiction of the Chinese Protestor Sub-Model. For 
purposes of this sub-model, a “protestor” is defined as a person willing to take an extra-legal 
action as a result of dissatisfaction with some aspect of governance, economics, or social 
circumstances or a combination thereof. Actions can run the entire spectrum of violence, from 
peaceful civil disobedience through large scale public demonstrations to riots, destruction of 
property, and armed attacks on the existing mechanisms of governance (i.e. the CCP). The 
legality of the protest action is defined by the existing government. As can be seen during the 
recent protests in Hong Kong, the government can decide whether peaceful demonstrations 
present enough of a perceived threat to public order and stability as to be declared illegal. 
The basic structure of the Protestor Sub-Model is that of a classical infectious disease 
model. The same structure has been used to model the adoption of new ideas or technologies. 
 
Figure 28. Chinese Protestor Sub-Model 
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The model consists of two pools of people; the Potential Protestors (those adults who could 
decide or be persuaded to engage in extra-legal actions) and Protestors (those people willing to 
take part in extra-legal actions). A person who is dissatisfied with some aspect of government or 
society does not present an existential threat to the existing order unless that individual takes 
actions against the government. You can be as dissatisfied as you want, as long as you don’t do 
anything about it. 
The term “extra-legal” is used instead of “illegal” to describe actions taken outside the 
acceptable framework of dissent. A small peaceful demonstration may technically not be 
sanctioned by the government because proper permits and permissions were not obtained, but the 
demonstration may in effect be permitted by the government’s inaction against the demonstrators 
as long as the perceived threat does not cross some threshold. 
(1)  Assumptions and Limitations. 
The limitations of the basic infectious disease model (or “SI” model for “Susceptible-
Infected”) are well known.  
• This model assumes a homogeneous distribution of Potential Protestor and 
Protestor. This does not take into account geographic distribution of population. The contact rate 
is uniform with respect to spatial distribution. 
• There is no recovery (i.e. movement from Protestor back to Potential Protestor) 
once you become a Protestor. 
• The Potential Protestor population cannot be “vaccinated” against becoming a 
Protestor. There may be education and propaganda means by which the Potential Protestor 
population may be reduced. 
• Eventually the SI model will produce a 100% infected population, or in this case 
eventually 100% of the Total Adult Population will become Protestors. 
(2)  Sub-Model Inputs.  
The Chinese Protestor Sub-Model has four user-controllable inputs; Contact Rate, 
Governance Dissatisfaction, Economic Dissatisfaction, and Social Dissatisfaction. Contact Rate 
is the average number of times per year a member of the Potential Protestor population comes 
into contact with a member of the Protestor population. In an infectious disease situation, contact 
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can be defined in relation to the disease transmission mechanism, e.g. contact with another 
person’s bodily fluids, unprotected sexual contact, using unsafe water sources, etc. In the case of 
ideas, the concept of “contact” can be more ethereal, not relying on person-to-person contact. 
Contact might be exposure to media (traditional or digital) urging a person to join in a protest 
movement. In the case of digital media, Contact Rate would be affected by such factors as 
internet penetration, media censorship, and availability of social networking.  
The Governance Dissatisfaction, Economic Dissatisfaction, and Social Dissatisfaction 
factors are summed together into the Radicalization Fraction, which represents the probability 
that any contact between a Potential Protestor and a Protestor will result in conversion 
(“radicalization”) of the Potential Protestor into a Protestor. The dissatisfaction factors are added 
together to reflect an assumption that on the average it is not just a single factor that will cause a 
Potential Protestor to become a Protestor, but rather the accumulation of dissatisfaction with a 
number of issues.  






Chinese Protestor Sub-Model produces a graph (Figure 29) showing the number of Protestors 
and Potential Protestors compared to the Total Adult Population over time (the current 
simulation duration, 25 years). The crossover point between Potential Protestors and Protestors 
depends on the input parameters. This example graph shows a situation that the Chinese 
government would want to avoid at all costs, namely a runaway radicalization of the adult 
population resulting in total loss of stability and probable end to the existing regime.  
The formulation of the Protestor Sub-Model as an infectious disease model gives some 
insight into how the CCP might choose to prevent a runaway radicalization (an “epidemic of 
rioters”). The Chinese government could seek to lower the Contact Rate through censorship of 
media, limitations on public gatherings, quarantine of “infectious” individuals though arrest, 
detention, imprisonment, or exile of dissidents. The Chinese government could also seek to 
reduce the radicalization fraction by either effectively addressing the root causes of 
dissatisfaction, or raising the barriers to becoming a Protestor through intimidation, threat of 
imprisonment, or violent crackdowns against protest demonstrations. While such actions may not 
lower the level of dissatisfaction among potential protestors, the more severe the potential 
consequences are for participating in extralegal actions the less likely potential protestors are to 
convert from passive to active participation as a protestor. 
(4)  Data Sources. 
The Total Adult Population is based on data from China’s 2010 Census as reported both 
on official Chinese Government web-sites and the CIA World Fact Book. There exists little 
identifiable data that quantifies such factors as the portion of protestors in the Chinese population 
and how likely the average Chinese adult is to become a protestor as a function of governance, 
economic, or social dissatisfaction. These factors are modeled as user-selectable input so that 
users can experiment and observe the effects of changing values on the dynamic behavior of 
quantities of interest. 
(5)  Sub-Model Interfaces. 
The Protestor Sub-Model interfaces to the Chinese Demographics Sub-Model though the 
Total Adult Population. The sub-model also interfaces to the Tension Sub-Model through the 
Figure 29. Example graph of Chinese Protestors versus Potential Protestors over time 
for a given set of inputs. 
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Protest Indicator and the Chinese Perceived Chinese Influence. As currently configured, a 5% 





V. DASHBOARD FLIGHT SIMULATOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The term “Dashboard Flight Simulator” (Figure 30) refers to a streamlined user interface 
to the PACOM SMA SD model. The iThink® software offers an Interface layer on which user 
controls, model inputs and outputs can be arranged to give users a cleaner interface without the 
need to delve into the details of the actual models. Simulation controls are provided to facilitate 
repetitive simulation runs, thus encouraging users to conduct “what if” analysis by varying the 
values of the inputs.  
B. DESIGN OVERVIEW 
The Dashboard Flight Simulator is divided into three functional areas; inputs, outputs, 
and controls. The graphs on the left side display results (outputs) of the simulation runs. 
Underneath the graphs are a series of simulation controls that let the user start, pause, stop, and 
reset simulation runs. On the right side of the screen is an area containing user input controls, in 
this case toggle switches and sliders that let the user decide which potential destabilizing events 
will occur, and the likelihood and frequency of such events occurring. See the Model Quick Start 
Guide for further details.  
 




C. MODEL DEMONSTRATION 
The following example illustrates how the SD model might be used during a wargame 
simulation to gain insights into the dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship. A series of model 
screenshots are used to provide a simple demonstration. Figure 31 establishes a baseline where 
no changes are made to the underlying model and the three graphs correspond to (top to bottom) 
U.S. Defense Expenditure, Tension Resulting from External Destabilizing Events, and the 
Number of Protestors in China. While any number of variables may be shown, in this example 
the user decided to observe the impact destabilizing events may have on U.S. and Chinese 
military spending and the potential number of protestors within China. 
 
Figure 31. Dashboard Interface Demonstration: Baseline Model 
Note that this example chooses to include the full interface rather than focus in detail on 
the graphs on the left side of the interface. While this makes it difficult to view the exact 
numbers on each graph, this example is intended to demonstrate how the model can be used to 
identify general trends and identify relationships between variables, rather than make specific 
numerical predictions. The tool contains more numerical detail which can used to demonstrate 
the impact of each modeling event in this demonstration. 
Suppose during the wargame an exercise injection is introduced consisting of a 
destabilizing incident on the Korean Peninsula in 2025. The user would open the Dashboard 
Flight Simulator Interface and switch off all the destabilizing events in order to run a baseline 
case with no destabilizing events (as shown in Figure 31). The user would decide which model 
variable(s) are of interest to observe the impact of the exercise inject. The user would then 
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modify one of the graphs (e.g. the top graph) on the interface to display U.S. and Chinese 
military spending as a function of time. After making sure the bottom graph, which shows the 
number of protestors in China, is set to show comparative runs (meaning that the graphs will 
populate with new information on top of the information obtained in previous model runs), the 
user then examines the impact that the destabilizing event has on each variable of interest (Figure 
32). 
 
Figure 32. Dashboard Interface Demonstration: Korean Destabilizing Event 
Notice the changes in each of the graphs. The center graph, showing the tension resulting 
from a destabilizing event, now shows a spike during the year 2025 corresponding to the Korean 
event. The top graph shows an associated increase in defense spending, which persists for five 
years and subsequently reverts to expected levels. The bottom graph, where the blue line 
corresponds to the baseline run and the red line corresponds to the new run, shows an increase in 
the number of protestors beginning around the time of the event and not returning to expected 
levels at any point, suggesting that any increase in the number of protestors is difficult to correct. 
The model can examine an alternative scenario that demonstrates large perturbations are 
not necessary to prompt substantial changes to the model behavior. In Figure 33, the Korean 
destabilizing event is removed from the model (accomplished through the use of the associated 





Figure 33. Dashboard Interface Demonstration: Increased Chinese Domestic Oil 
Consumption 
Note that the top two graphs mirror the baseline case, but the bottom graph suggests that 
this persistent reliance on oil (which is assumed to occur as a percentage increase from 2025-
2040) actually has a greater impact on the number of protestors than does the previously 
introduced destabilizing event on the Korean peninsula (as shown by the purple line). Detailed 
examination of the graphs shows that the destabilizing event will result in a 23% increase in the 
number of protestors while the increased reliance on domestic sources of oil will result in a 37% 
increase in the number of protestors. The relationship between those potentially impactful future 
events can be examined through a third potential wargame inject, where the multiplying effect of 
both an increased reliance on domestic oil in China and a destabilizing event on the Korean 




Figure 34. Dashboard Interface Demonstration: Increased Chinese Domestic Oil 
Consumption and Korean Peninsula Destabilizing Event 
Notice that the top graph again shows a brief increase in defense spending resulting from 
the destabilization of the Korean peninsula. The bottom graph now shows the multiplying effect 
of both potential wargame injects (green line). Further examination of the graph within the tool 
suggests that the increased reliance on domestic oil and the destabilizing event in 2025 results in 
a 66% increase in the number of protestors, a far greater impact than when either event was 
modeled in isolation. Using the tool to examine the final number of protestors reinforces the 
utility of the model in identifying relationships between events and variables. Specifically, if the 
results of wargame injects one and two were considered separately and a prediction was made 
about the potential impact of both injects occurring simultaneously, simply summing the number 
of protestors of each individual model run would underestimate the number of protestors by 11% 
when compared to the model run that considered the events simultaneously. Stated differently, 
the true utility of the model is the ability to model the interactions between events/variables, the 





























A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
International relations are complex interactions in which multiple actors (both nation-
states and non-nation-states) are presumably pursuing agendas to maximize their own interests. 
These interactions led to secondary and tertiary effects that are often difficult to foresee, and 
could possibly even have deleterious effects on national interests. Systems dynamics modeling 
provides a way to holistically integrate and visualize relationships and simulate outcomes based 
on these highly interconnected, non-linear relationships. The PACOM SMA SD model integrates 
economic, energy, military and political stability views into a greater picture that can inform 
PACOM strategic planners and provide a tool for planners to examine possible scenarios within 
the US-PRC relationship. 
Recommend that the PACOM SMA SD model to given to PACOM strategic planners for 
their use, and their feedback be incorporated into a revised SD model. 
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current PACOM SMA SD model focuses mostly on the U.S.-China relationship and 
the level of tension in the PACOM AOR between the US and China. There are other important 
regional actors (North and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines) that 
could be added to the model.  
Based on feedback from use of the PACOM SMA Dashboard Flight Simulator Interface 
during the ICONS simulation, the interface can be improved to increase its clarity and usefulness 






























During the period March 2014 through April 2015, faculty and students from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) took part in the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) for the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM). The SMA process provides planning support for complex 
operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that were not 
currently within core competencies of Combatant Commands. The PACOM SMA focused on 
identifying the drivers of conflict and convergence in the PACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
over the next 25 years (2015-2040).  
The NPS contribution to the SMA overcomes current conceptualization limitations by 
using a Systems Dynamics (SD) viewpoint to examine U.S.–China relations. This approach 
employed systems thinking and systems dynamics methodologies to analyze the policy structures 
of major issues of concern common to U.S. and China which result in non-linear and dynamic 
behavior over time. Causal loop diagrams were developed to describe economic relationships, 
energy consumption, and tension between the U.S. and China. Tension was selected as an 
underlying surrogate to overall U.S.–China relations. A commercial SD software package, 
iThink® 10.0.6, was used to build a model composed of four sectors of common concern: energy 
demand and resources, demographics and stability, economics, and military actions. These sector 
models were then used to model tension between the U.S. and China over the next 25 years.  
An interface to the SD model was developed that allowed users to run simulations whose 
dynamic outputs were determined by the model’s relationships and user defined values for key 
variables. The intent was to provide a tool that would assist policy makers to better understand 
how the system's variables are related, how they influence one another, and how they are 
influenced by the system's external environment. The simulation tool also supported decision / 
policy making by allowing analysts to explore the effects of these variables on potential futures. 
The tool was provided as part of an SMA products package to a treatment group of participants 





























APPENDIX A – MODEL VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS 
Additional Destabilizing 
Actions 
Based on conversations with subject matter experts at CEIP, 
START and Monitor 360, five categories of military actions 
were developed. These actions are considered to be 
destabilizing actions that increase tension. (Dimensionless) 
Centenarian Rate Rate at which seniors leave the potential protestor population. (People/year) 
Child Migration Rate at which children migrate out of China. (People/year) 
Childhood Mortality Rate Rate at which children leave the total Chinese population. (People/year) 
Children Total number of children in the Chinese population. (People) 
Contact Rate 
Control variable which governs the flow of people from the 
potential protestor group to the protestor group. 
(Dimensionless) 
Crude Birth Rate Rate at which the total Chinese population can generate children.  (People/year) 
Direct PRC Actions to 
Lower Tension 
Actions taken by China to reduce the level of tension in US-
China relations. (dimensionless) 
Direct US Actions to Lower 
Tension 
Actions taken by the US to reduce the level of tension in US-
China relations. (dimensionless) 
Economic Dissatisfaction Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to economic concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Energy Demand per PRC 
HH 
Annualized Chinese energy demand per household (HH) in 
BTU equivalents. Chinese household energy demand per 
household is forecast to decrease from 2015 to 2040 due to a 
combination of factors, including a reduced number of persons 
per household, more energy efficient buildings, and planned 
upgrades to energy transmission infrastructure. 
Environmental Concerns Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to environmental concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Ethnic Conflict Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to ethnic concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Governance Dissatisfaction Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to governance concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
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Intentional Quasi Military 
Destabilizing Event 
An example of an intentional quasi-military action would be 
the establishment of an exclusion zone by China. Usually the 
purpose of this would be to gauge the resolve of the opposing 
nation. In the example of the most recent exclusion zone 
established by China, the U.S. and Japan responded with their 
quasi-military action of continuing to send aircraft or ships 
through the zone. These incidents have the potential to escalate 
based on the resolve of each nation. When China set up the 
exclusion zone and the U.S. and Japan sent fighters through the 
zone, China scrambled jets but did not escalate the situation 
further. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Frequency 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability 
will affect each year of occurrence. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event On?Off 
Control variable which turns this type of event on or off. “Off” 
is equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year and 
with the frequency specified. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability that the 
event occurs in this year is set by 'event probability.'  The event 
will re-occur every xx years, as specified by frequency. 
Live Births Rate at which children join the total Chinese population.  Random variable with Normal distribution. (People/year) 
Majority Rate Rate at which children become young adults (People/yr) 
Maturing Rate Rate at which young adults become mid-adults (People) 
Mid Adult Death Rate Rate at which mid-adults leave the total Chinese population. (People/year) 
Mid Adult Migration Rate at which mid-adults migrate out of China. (People/year) 
Mid Adults Total number of mid-adults in the Chinese population. (People) 
Net Migration Rate Rate at which all population groups migrate out of China.(People/year) 
North Korea On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
North Korean Destabilizing 
Event 
Currently, China has publicly condemned North Korea’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, a change in rhetoric by 
North Korea, such as the threat of collapse, could alter China’s 
policy toward North Korea. It could cause China to change its 
stance on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. This would likely 
lead to more aggressive U.S. intervention to stop nuclear 
proliferation, and this would certainly raise tensions to the 
highest levels. 
North Korean Destabilizing 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year and 
with the frequency specified. 
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North Korean Destabilizing 
Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability that the 
event occurs in this year is set by 'event probability.'  The event 
will re-occur every xx years, as specified by frequency. 
Number of PRC 
Households 
Projected number of households in China  The number of 
Chinese households is forecast to increase in 25 years from 
approximately 430 million to a little over 500 million.   This is 
due to both projected population increase and decreasing 
average Chinese household size.   Household size is decreasing 
due to a combination of Chinese incentives promoting 
urbanization, reduced number of children per couple, and a 
growing middle class which tends to have fewer children per 
household. 
Potential Protesters 
Group within the total Chinese population that has the potential 
to become protestors.  The very young and very old typically 
do not become protestors. (People) 
Potential Protestor Flow Rate at which the total adult population can become potential protestors. (People/year) 
PRC Aggressive 
Influencing Action 
Action taken by the Chinese to increase actual/perceived 
influence.  The use of the word aggressive  signifies that this 
action is beyond normal Chinese action and is meant to send a 
clear message. (dimensionless) 
PRC Change in Inventories Projected Chinese on hand inventories ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Change in Inventories 
Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
Chinese inventories . 
PRC Coal  Consumption Stock representing Chinese Coal consumption (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Coal Import Graphical variable of projected yearly coal imports (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Desired Level of Own 
Influence 
Level of influence China desires to have within the PACOM 
AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Desired US Influence Level of influence China desires the US to have within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Domestic Coal 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly coal production 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Domestic LNG LPG 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly domestic LNG/LPG 
production (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Domestic Oil 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly domestic oil production 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Economic Driver Control variable linking Chinese GDP to influence within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Economic Influencing 
Action 
Economic actions China takes to reduce the level of tension in 
US-China relations. (dimensionless) 
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PRC Energy Environmental 
Damage Percentage 
Percentage of energy resources consumed from domestic 
environmentally-damaging sources such as coal, oil and LNG-
LPG with respect to China's overall total energy resource 
consumption. The higher the percentage, the more potential 
damage might be done to China's environment. (%) 
PRC Energy Import Risk 
Percentage 
Percent of total Chinese energy consumption provided by 
imports. (%)  As China becomes more reliant on external 
sources of energy to meet its economic goals, the state 
perceives more risk to its energy import activities by other 
nations.   That risk is one driver why China is looking to 
expand its near off-shore influence and control as well as 
expand the reach of the PLAN to protect vital energy import 
sea lanes. 
PRC Export Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese gross export. 
PRC Exports Projected Chinese gross exports. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Final Consumption 
Expenditure 
Project Chinese govt and household expenditures. ($Billions 
2012) 
PRC GDP Projected total Chinese Gross Domestic Product.  ($Billions 2012) 
PRC GDP Per Capita Chinese Per capita GDP.  ($Billions 2012/person) 
PRC Govt Defense 
Expenditure Projected Chinese govt defense expenditures. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Govt Defense 
Expenditure Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
Chinese DE. 
PRC Govt NDE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese NDE. 
PRC Govt NonDefense 
Expenditure 
Projected Chinese govt non-defense expenditures. ($Billions 
2012) 
PRC Gross Capital 
Formation 
Projected Chinese capital formation which includes fixed 
capital and value of inventories. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Projected Chinese capital formation. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
Chinese gross fixed capital formation. 
PRC HCE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese HCE. 
PRC Heavy Industry 
Demand 
The Chinese economy's projected demand for energy to support 
construction, mining, commercial transportation, traditional 
manufacturing, etc. The majority of Chinese military energy 
demand falls into this category. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Heavy Industry 
Energy Demand 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected demand 
for energy to support construction, mining, commercial 
transportation, traditional manufacturing, etc.   The majority of 




PRC Heavy Industry 
Energy Flow 
The Chinese economy's projected annualized demand for 
energy to support construction, mining, commercial 
transportation, traditional manufacturing, etc.   The majority of 
Chinese military energy demand falls into this category. 
(Quadrillion BTU/year) 
PRC HH Demand The Chinese household's projected demand for energy (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC HH Demand Flow The Chinese household's projected annualized demand for energy. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
PRC HH Energy Demand 
Annualized 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected demand 
for energy. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Household 
Consumption Expenditure 
Projected Chinese household consumptions expenditures.  
($Billions 2012) 
PRC Hydro Electric 
Production 
Chinese projected production of energy from hydroelectric 
energy sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Import Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese gross imports. 
PRC Imports Gross Chinese imports.  Affected by Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption.  ($Billions 2012) 
PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG): Broken down by amount imported primarily by sea 
through the PACOM AOR and by existing or planned pipelines 
from the 2014 Russian-Chinese LNG-LPG agreement and 
domestically produced. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC LNG LPG Imports 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected demand 
for imported Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Net Exports 
Projected Chinese net exports.  Net exports are influenced by 
the number of Chinese protestors in the social and 
demographics sub-model.  ($Billions 2012) 
PRC NHR Consumption 
Nuclear-Hydroelectric-Renewables (NHR) broken down by 
domestic nuclear production, hydro-electric production, and 
renewables to include solar, wind and biomass production. 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non HH Energy 
Demand 
Total energy demand from Chinese heavy industry and non-
industrial sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non Industrial  Energy 
Demand 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected demand 
for energy to support information technologies, office 
buildings, education facilities, health care facilities, etc.   The 
majority of Chinese state government energy demand falls into 
this category with the exception of state owned heavy industrial 
companies. (Quadrillion BTU) 
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PRC Non Industrial 
Demand 
The Chinese economy's projected demand for energy to support 
information technologies, office buildings, education facilities, 
health care facilities, etc.   The majority of Chinese state 
government energy demand falls into this category with the 
exception of state owned heavy industrial companies. 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non Industrial Energy 
Flow 
The Chinese economy's projected annualized demand for for 
energy to support information technologies, office buildings, 
education facilities, health care facilities, etc.   The majority of 
Chinese state government energy demand falls into this 
category with the exception of state owned heavy industrial 
companies. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
PRC Nuclear Production Chinese projected production of energy from all nuclear energy sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Oil Consumption 
Stock representing Chinese oil consumption; primary liquid 
crude, broken down by amount imported and domestically 
produced. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Oil Import Graphical variable of projected yearly oil imports (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Perceived PRC 
Influence 
Level of influence China perceives itself as having within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Perceived US 
Influence 
Level of influence China perceives the US as having within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Renewables  
Production 
Chinese projected production of energy from all renewable 
(except hydroelectric) energy sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRNK Destab Event Freq Frequency with which this type of event will occur. Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Protest Impact on Influence Control variable linking civil unrest in China with Chinese influence within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
Protest Indicator Control variable set when the total number of protestors increases faster that a given rate.  (Dimensionless) 
Protester Rate Rate at which the population of potential protestors becomes protestors. (People/year) 
Protesters Total Chinese population of protestors. (People) 
Radicalization Fraction 
Control variable which governs the flow of people from the 
potential protestor group to the protestor group.  Contains 
economic, social, and governance dissatisfaction. 
(Dimensionless) 
Religious Conflict Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to religious concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Retirement Rate Rate at which mid-adults become seniors. (People/year) 
ROC Destab Event Freq Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
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Russian LNG LPG Import 
Deal 
Graphical variable depicting potential for China and Russia to 
agree to LNG/LPG pipeline and trade agreement. (Quadrillion 
BTU) 
Senior Death Rate Rate at which seniors leave the total Chinese population(People/year) 
Senior Migration Rate at which seniors migrate out of China. (People/year) 
Seniors Total number of seniors in the Chinese population(People) 
Social Dissatisfaction Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to religious, ethnic, or environmental concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Stabilizing Actions Actions taken by the US or China to reduce the level of tension in relations. (dimensionless) 
Taiwan On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off. Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event 
This is the least likely but also the most dangerous scenario. 
This will bring tensions to the highest levels and likely lead to 
war if the situation isn’t balanced by a stabilizing action. An 
example of this would be if the Chinese government loses 
patience with the continued sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan, or if 
the U.S. gives Taiwan a new technology that significantly 
increases Taiwan’s defense capabilities. This could cause the 
Chinese to respond with an aggressive military action. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year and 
with the frequency specified. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability that the 
event occurs in this year is set by 'event probability.’ The event 
will re-occur every xx years, as specified by frequency. 
Tension between US and 
China Analogue for US-Chinese relations. (dimensionless) 
Third Party Destab Event 
Freq 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability 
will affect each year of occurrence. 
Third Party Destabilizing 
Event 
This is different from the 2nd category because it originates 
with an action initiated from a third party whereas the above 
scenario deals with a Chinese or U.S. action specifically in 
Taiwan or North Korea. An example of this would be if Japan 
took actions to aggressively occupy South China Sea islands, 
and was confronted by Chinese military units. Even though the 
U.S. may not agree with Japanese actions, they could get 
dragged into a conflict based on their treaty obligations. 
Similarly, if North Korea’s nuclear development reaches a level 
that the U.S. perceives as dangerous, this could cause the U.S. 
to take action, and these actions could invoke the Sino-North 
Korean treaty obligating China to get involved.  This scenario 
likely could be resolved by China and U.S. unless one of those 
two nations responds very aggressively to the third party. 
Third Party Destabilizing 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year and 
with the frequency specified. 
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Third Party Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability that the 
event occurs in this year is set by 'event probability.’ The event 
will re-occur every xx years, as specified by frequency. 
Third Party On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off. Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Total Adult Population Total Chinese adult population. (People) 
Total Population Total Chinese population. (People) 
Total PRC Coal 
Consumption 
Projected annualized projected PRC coal consumption 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC Coal 
Consumption Flow 
Flow variable to translate Total_PRC_Coal_Consumption into 
a stock (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC Consumption 
Annualized Flow 
Projected, annualized flow variable translating Chinese energy 
resource consumption into a stock.  (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC Demand 
Annualized Flow 
Flow variable to translate total annual energy into a stock 
(Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC Energy 
Consumption 
Projected Chinese energy resource consumption in four 
primary categories:  Coal, oil, LNG/LPG/, and 
Nuclear/Hydro/Renewables.  (Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC Energy Demand Total Chinese energy demand from household, heavy industry, and non-industrial demand sources.  (Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption 
The Chinese economy's projected annual demand for Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
(Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption Flow 
The Chinese household's projected annualized demand for 
LNG/LPG. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC NHR 
Consumption 
Projected annualized projected PRC NHR consumption 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC NHR 
Consumption Flow 
Flow variable to translate NHR consumption into a stock 
(Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC Oil Consumption The Chinese economy's projected annual demand for oil. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC Oil Consumption 
Flow 
Flow variable to translate Total_PRC_Oil_Consumption into a 




An example of an unintentional action is a collision at sea by a 
Chinese vessel and one from a U.S. or allied nation. This 
situation could potentially escalate depending on the actions of 
the local actors involved. In the past, these situations have 
raised tensions but usually are resolved through discussions 
between leaders of both governments. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event Frequency 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability 
will affect each year of occurrence. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event On?Off 
Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  




Military Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year and 
with the frequency specified. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability that the 
event occurs in this year is set by 'event probability.’ The event 
will re-occur every xx years, as specified by frequency. 
US Aggressive Influencing 
Action 
Action taken by the US to increase actual/perceived influence.  
The use of the word aggressive signifies that this action is 
beyond normal US action and is meant to send a clear message. 
(dimensionless) 
US Change in Inventories Projected US on hand inventories ($Billions 2012) 
US Change in Inventories 
Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
US inventories. 
US Desired Level of Own 
Influence 
Level of influence the US desires within PACOM AOR. 
(dimensionless) 
US Desired PRC Influence Level of influence the US desires China to have within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
US Economic Driver Control variable linking US GDP to influence within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
US Economic Influencing 
Action 
Economic actions the US takes to reduce the level of tension in 
US-China relations. (dimensionless) 
US Export Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US gross export. 
US Exports Projected US gross exports. ($Billions 2012) 
US Final Consumption 
Expenditure Project US govt and household expenditures. ($Billions 2012) 
US GDP Projected total US Gross Domestic Product.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Govt Defense 
Expenditure Projected US govt defense expenditures. ($Billions 2012) 
US Govt Defense 
Expenditure Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
US DE. 
US Govt NDE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US NDE. 
US Govt NonDefense 
Expenditure Projected US govt non-defense expenditures. ($Billions 2012) 
US Gross Capital Formation Projected US capital formation which includes fixed capital and value of inventories. ($Billions 2012) 
US Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Projected US capital formation. ($Billions 2012) 
US Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
US gross fixed capital formation. 
US  Household 
Consumption Expenditure 
(HCE) Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in 
US Household Consumption Expenditure. 
US Household 
Consumption Expenditure 







US Import Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US gross imports. 
US Imports Gross US imports.  Affected by Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Net Exports 
Projected US net exports.  Net exports are influenced by the 
number of US protestors in the social and demographics sub-
model.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Perceived PRC 
Influence 
Level of influence the US perceives China as having within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
US Perceived US Influence Level of influence the US perceives itself as having within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
Young Adult Death Rate Rate at which young adults leave the total Chinese population(People/year) 
Young Adult Migration Rate at which young adults migrate out of China. (People/year) 
Young Adults Total number of young adults in the Chinese population(People) 
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APPENDIX B – FULL MODEL EQUATIONS LISTING 
The following equation listing is generated by the iThink software package, and 
represents a complete listing of the equations that constitute the systems dynamics model. 
Potential_Protesters(t) = Potential_Protesters(t - dt) + (Potential_Protestor_Flow - 
Protester_Rate) * dt 
INIT Potential_Protesters = 0.99*INIT(Total_Adult_Population) 
INFLOWS: 





PRC_Coal__Consumption(t) = PRC_Coal__Consumption(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_Coal_Consumption_Flow) * dt 
INIT PRC_Coal__Consumption = 78 
INFLOWS: 
Total_PRC_Coal_Consumption_Flow = Total_PRC__Coal_Consumption 
PRC_GDP(t) = PRC_GDP(t - dt) + (PRC_Net_Exports + PRC_Gross_Capital_Formation + 
PRC_Final_Consumption_Expenditure) * dt 
INIT PRC_GDP = 2000 
INFLOWS: 











PRC_Heavy_Industry_Demand(t) = PRC_Heavy_Industry_Demand(t - dt) + 
(PRC_Heavy_Industry_Energy_Flow) * dt 






PRC_HH_Demand(t) = PRC_HH_Demand(t - dt) + (PRC_HH_Demand_Flow) * dt 
INIT PRC_HH_Demand = 43 
INFLOWS: 
PRC_HH_Demand_Flow = PRC_HH_Energy_Demand_Annualized 
PRC_LNG_LPG_Consumption(t) = PRC_LNG_LPG_Consumption(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_LNG_LPG__Consumption_Flow) * dt 
INIT PRC_LNG_LPG_Consumption = 9.6 
INFLOWS: 
Total_PRC_LNG_LPG__Consumption_Flow = Total_PRC_LNG__LPG_Consumption 
PRC_NHR__Consumption(t) = PRC_NHR__Consumption(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_NHR_Consumption_Flow) * dt 
INIT PRC_NHR__Consumption = 10.8 
INFLOWS: 
Total_PRC_NHR_Consumption_Flow = Total_PRC_NHR_Consumption 
PRC_Non_Industrial_Demand(t) = PRC_Non_Industrial_Demand(t - dt) + 
(PRC_Non_Industrial_Energy_Flow) * dt 




PRC_Oil__Consumption(t) = PRC_Oil__Consumption(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_Oil__Consumption_Flow) * dt 
INIT PRC_Oil__Consumption = 21.6 
INFLOWS: 
Total_PRC_Oil__Consumption_Flow = Total_PRC__Oil_Consumption 
PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence(t) = PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence(t - dt) + 
(PRC_Economic_Influencing_Action - US_Aggressive_Influencing_Action - 
Protest_Impact_on_Influence) * dt 
INIT PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence = 0 
INFLOWS: 




US_Aggressive_Influencing_Action = IF US_Desired_Level__of_Own_Influence-
US_Perceived_US_Influence >= 0 OR US_Desired_PRC_Influence-
US_Perceived_PRC_Influence < 0 THEN 5 ELSE 0 
Protest_Impact_on_Influence = Protest_Indicator 
Protesters(t) = Protesters(t - dt) + (Protester_Rate) * dt 





Tension_between__US_and_China(t) = Tension_between__US_and_China(t - dt) + 
(US_Aggressive_Influencing_Action + PRC_Aggessive_Influencing_Action + 
Additional_Destabilizing_Actions - Stabilizing_Actions) * dt 
INIT Tension_between__US_and_China = 0 
INFLOWS: 
US_Aggressive_Influencing_Action = IF US_Desired_Level__of_Own_Influence-
US_Perceived_US_Influence >= 0 OR US_Desired_PRC_Influence-
US_Perceived_PRC_Influence < 0 THEN 5 ELSE 0 
PRC_Aggessive_Influencing_Action = IF PRC_Desired_Level_of_Own_Influence-
PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence >= 0 OR PRC_Desired_US_Influence-








Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption(t) = Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_Consumption__Annualized_Flow) * dt 





Total_PRC_Energy_Demand(t) = Total_PRC_Energy_Demand(t - dt) + 
(Total_PRC_Demand_Annualized_Flow) * dt 






US_GDP(t) = US_GDP(t - dt) + (US_Net_Exports + US_Final_Consumption_Expenditure + 
US_Gross_Capital_Formation) * dt 
INIT US_GDP = 2000 
INFLOWS: 









US_Perceived_US_Influence(t) = US_Perceived_US_Influence(t - dt) + 
(US_Economic_Influencing_Action - PRC_Aggessive_Influencing_Action) * dt 
INIT US_Perceived_US_Influence = 0 
INFLOWS: 
US_Economic_Influencing_Action = US_Economic_Driver 
OUTFLOWS: 
PRC_Aggessive_Influencing_Action = IF PRC_Desired_Level_of_Own_Influence-
PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence >= 0 OR PRC_Desired_US_Influence-
PRC_Perceived_US_Influence < 0 THEN 5 ELSE 0 
Children(t) = Children(t - dt) + (Live_Births - Majority_Rate - Childhood_Mortality_Rate - 
Child_Migration) * dt 
INIT Children = 20775369, 18790521, 18024484, 15893800, 15225032, 15399559, 13935714, 
14454357, 14248825, 13666956, 13429161, 14804470, 14732137, 15220041, 15250805, 
15617375, 15657955, 13786434 
 TRANSIT TIME = 18 
 CAPACITY = INF 
 INFLOW LIMIT = INF 
INFLOWS: 
Live_Births = NORMAL(Total_Population*Crude_Birth_Rate/1000, 1000000) 
OUTFLOWS: 
Majority_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
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Childhood_Mortality_Rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = 17.62*(Live_Births/1000)/Children 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 10% 
Child_Migration = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = .2*Net_Migration_Rate 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
Mid_Adults(t) = Mid_Adults(t - dt) + (Maturing_Rate - Retirement__Rate - 
Mid_Adult_Death_Rate - Mid_Adult_Migration) * dt 
INIT Mid_Adults = 9951467, 10791633, 11276853, 13029125 , 13618204, 13701998, 
16167933, 16093888, 17738127, 17610528, 16847642, 18351980, 16617709,  12838832,  
14097008, 11228960, 20075084, 26972157,  23355778, 23962574, 24012158, 21355748, 
27032542, 24956297, 27397219 
 TRANSIT TIME = 25 
 CAPACITY =  
 INFLOW LIMIT =  
INFLOWS: 
Maturing_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
OUTFLOWS: 
Retirement__Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
Mid_Adult_Death_Rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.001 
 LEAK ZONE = 42% to 100% 
Mid_Adult_Migration = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.3*Net_Migration_Rate 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
Seniors(t) = Seniors(t - dt) + (Retirement__Rate - Centenarian_Rate - Senior_Death_Rate - 
Senior_Migration) * dt 
INIT Seniors = 35934, 38231,54689, 68648, 90889, 117522, 156456, 209291, 287676, 371079, 
553805, 715398, 858879,  1065276, 1344215, 1648160, 1824190, 2237138, 2757918, 2816693, 
3737259, 3706915, 4254858, 5082383,  5175500, 5632477, 6080173, 6343869, 6893225, 
6265718, 7389412, 7715897, 7740868, 7942141, 8640965, 9073411   
 TRANSIT TIME = 36 
 CAPACITY =  




Retirement__Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
OUTFLOWS: 
Centenarian_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
Senior_Death_Rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.99 
 LEAK ZONE = 28.999999999999996% to 100% 
Senior_Migration = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = .1*Net_Migration_Rate 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
Young_Adults(t) = Young_Adults(t - dt) + (Majority_Rate - Maturing_Rate - 
Young_Adult_Death_Rate - Young_Adult_Migration) * dt 
INIT Young_Adults = 25211795, 24730460, 23990208, 22906980, 21186516, 20689024, 
18179478,  19474874, 19866458,  18928369, 19568009, 22322147, 19480836,  19709177,  
19933683, 22658768, 25695955, 24474192, 26556649,  28026954, 21543466, 20755274 
 TRANSIT TIME = 22 
 CAPACITY =  
 INFLOW LIMIT =  
INFLOWS: 
Majority_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
OUTFLOWS: 
Maturing_Rate = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW 
Young_Adult_Death_Rate = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = 0.001 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
Young_Adult_Migration = LEAKAGE OUTFLOW 
 LEAKAGE FRACTION = .4*Net_Migration_Rate 
 LEAK ZONE = 0% to 100% 
Contact_Rate = 2 







Economic_Dissatisfaction = IF PRC_GDP_Per_Capita/DELAY(PRC_GDP_Per_Capita,1)<1.01 
THEN 0.3 ELSE 0.2 
Energy_Demand_per_PRC_HH = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 1e+008), (2016, 1e+008), (2017, 1e+008), (2018, 1e+008), (2019, 1e+008), (2020, 
1e+008), (2021, 9.9e+007), (2022, 9.9e+007), (2023, 9.9e+007), (2024, 9.9e+007), (2025, 
9.9e+007), (2026, 9.8e+007), (2027, 9.8e+007), (2028, 9.8e+007), (2029, 9.7e+007), (2030, 
9.7e+007), (2031, 9.7e+007), (2032, 9.6e+007), (2033, 9.6e+007), (2034, 9.5e+007), (2035, 
9.5e+007), (2036, 9.5e+007), (2037, 9.4e+007), (2038, 9.4e+007), (2039, 9.3e+007), (2040, 
9.3e+007) 
Environmental_Concerns = 0.1* 
(PRC_Energy_Environmental_Damage_Percentage/DELAY(PRC_Energy_Environmental_Dam
age_Percentage,1)) 
Ethnic_Conflict = 0.05 
Governance_Dissatisfaction = 0.1 
Intentional_Quasi_MilitaryEvent_Year = 5 
Intentional_Quasi_Military_Destabilizing_Event = 
Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_On?Off*(IF 
RANDOM(0,1)<=Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Probability THEN 1 ELSE 
0)*(PULSE(2,Intentional_Quasi_MilitaryEvent_Year,Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Freque
ncy)) 
Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Frequency = 30 
Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_On?Off = 0 
Intentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Probability = 0 
Net_Migration_Rate = 0.00032 
North_Korean_Destabilizing_Event = North_Korea__On?Off*(IF 
(RANDOM(0,1)<=North_Korean_Destabilizing_Event_Probability)THEN 1 ELSE 
0)*(PULSE(15,North_Korean_Destabilizing_Event_Year,PRNK_Destab_Event_Freq)) 
North_Korean_Destabilizing_Event_Probability = 0 
North_Korean_Destabilizing_Event_Year = 5 
North_Korea__On?Off = 0 
Number_of_PRC_Households = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 4.3e+008), (2016, 4.3e+008), (2017, 4.4e+008), (2018, 4.4e+008), (2019, 4.5e+008), 
(2020, 4.5e+008), (2021, 4.5e+008), (2022, 4.6e+008), (2023, 4.6e+008), (2024, 4.7e+008), 
(2025, 4.7e+008), (2026, 4.7e+008), (2027, 4.8e+008), (2028, 4.8e+008), (2029, 4.8e+008), 
(2030, 4.8e+008), (2031, 4.9e+008), (2032, 4.9e+008), (2033, 4.9e+008), (2034, 4.9e+008), 
(2035, 4.9e+008), (2036, 5e+008), (2037, 5e+008), (2038, 5e+008), (2039, 5e+008), (2040, 
5e+008) 




PRC_Change_in_Inventories_Rate = 1 
PRC_Coal_Import = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 3.72), (2016, 6.64), (2017, 9.54), (2018, 12.3), (2019, 14.9), (2020, 17.2), (2021, 19.0), 
(2022, 20.3), (2023, 21.1), (2024, 21.4), (2025, 21.6), (2026, 21.9), (2027, 22.1), (2028, 22.4), 
(2029, 22.8), (2030, 23.2), (2031, 23.4), (2032, 23.6), (2033, 23.8), (2034, 23.8), (2035, 23.7), 
(2036, 23.4), (2037, 23.2), (2038, 22.9), (2039, 22.4), (2040, 21.9) 
PRC_Desired_Level_of_Own_Influence = 60 
PRC_Desired_US_Influence = 20 
PRC_Domestic__Coal_Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 74.3), (2016, 75.0), (2017, 75.8), (2018, 76.5), (2019, 77.3), (2020, 78.1), (2021, 78.8), 
(2022, 79.4), (2023, 80.0), (2024, 80.4), (2025, 80.8), (2026, 81.2), (2027, 81.4), (2028, 81.6), 
(2029, 81.7), (2030, 81.7), (2031, 81.6), (2032, 81.4), (2033, 81.2), (2034, 80.8), (2035, 80.4), 
(2036, 80.0), (2037, 79.4), (2038, 78.8), (2039, 78.0), (2040, 77.3) 
PRC_Domestic__LNG_LPG__Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 4.12), (2016, 4.37), (2017, 4.62), (2018, 4.87), (2019, 5.12), (2020, 5.38), (2021, 5.63), 
(2022, 5.88), (2023, 6.13), (2024, 6.38), (2025, 6.63), (2026, 6.88), (2027, 7.13), (2028, 7.39), 
(2029, 7.64), (2030, 7.89), (2031, 8.14), (2032, 8.39), (2033, 8.64), (2034, 8.89), (2035, 9.14), 
(2036, 9.40), (2037, 9.65), (2038, 9.90), (2039, 10.2), (2040, 10.4) 
PRC_Domestic__Oil_Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 9.82), (2016, 9.91), (2017, 9.99), (2018, 10.1), (2019, 10.2), (2020, 10.3), (2021, 10.3), 
(2022, 10.4), (2023, 10.5), (2024, 10.6), (2025, 10.7), (2026, 10.8), (2027, 10.9), (2028, 10.9), 
(2029, 11.0), (2030, 11.1), (2031, 11.2), (2032, 11.3), (2033, 11.4), (2034, 11.4), (2035, 11.5), 
(2036, 11.6), (2037, 11.7), (2038, 11.8), (2039, 11.9), (2040, 12.0) 









PRC_Export_Rate = 1 
PRC_GDP_Per_Capita = PRC_GDP/Total_Population 
PRC_Govt_Defense_Expenditure = 0.95*(PRC_Govt_Defense_Expenditure_Rate*(-48.69051 + 
6.1681126*(TIME-2015) + 0.5316626*(TIME-(2015+12))^2)) 




PRC_Govt_NDE_Rate = 1 
PRC_Govt_NonDefense__Expenditure = 0.95*(PRC_Govt_NDE_Rate*(-244.3581 
+33.652342*(TIME-2015)+2.6964831*(TIME-(2015+12))^2)) 
PRC_Gross_Fixed_Capital_Formation = 0.95*(PRC_Gross_Fixed_Capital_Formation_Rate*(-
1232.572 + 137.99788*(TIME-2015) + 12.71608*(TIME-(2015+12))^2)) 
PRC_Gross_Fixed_Capital_Formation_Rate = 1 
PRC_HCE_Rate = 1 
PRC_Heavy_Industry_Energy_Demand = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 66.0), (2016, 70.6), (2017, 75.2), (2018, 79.7), (2019, 84.1), (2020, 88.3), (2021, 91.8), 
(2022, 94.6), (2023, 96.5), (2024, 97.5), (2025, 98.0), (2026, 98.4), (2027, 98.9), (2028, 99.4), 
(2029, 99.9), (2030, 100), (2031, 101), (2032, 101), (2033, 101), (2034, 101), (2035, 102), (2036, 




PRC_Household_Consumption_Expenditure = 0.95*(PRC_HCE_Rate*(-699.2904 + 
103.77871*(TIME-2015)+8.2602632*(TIME-(2015+12))^2)) 
PRC_Hydro_Electric__Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 7.20), (2016, 7.63), (2017, 8.07), (2018, 8.52), (2019, 8.95), (2020, 9.37), (2021, 9.74), 
(2022, 10.1), (2023, 10.4), (2024, 10.6), (2025, 10.8), (2026, 12.8), (2027, 13.1), (2028, 13.3), 
(2029, 13.6), (2030, 13.9), (2031, 14.1), (2032, 14.3), (2033, 14.5), (2034, 14.7), (2035, 14.9), 
(2036, 17.1), (2037, 17.3), (2038, 17.4), (2039, 17.6), (2040, 17.6) 
PRC_Imports = 0.95*(IF Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption-




PRC_Import_Rate = 1 
PRC_LNG_LPG_Imports = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 5.48), (2016, 4.08), (2017, 2.48), (2018, 2.10), (2019, 3.23), (2020, 2.88), (2021, 4.05), 
(2022, 5.24), (2023, 6.44), (2024, 7.63), (2025, 7.04), (2026, 6.42), (2027, 7.65), (2028, 8.93), 
(2029, 10.3), (2030, 11.7), (2031, 11.0), (2032, 14.5), (2033, 15.9), (2034, 17.3), (2035, 18.8), 





PRC_Non_Industrial__Energy_Demand = GRAPH(TIME) 
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(2015, 11.0), (2016, 13.2), (2017, 15.6), (2018, 18.1), (2019, 20.6), (2020, 23.1), (2021, 25.4), 
(2022, 27.8), (2023, 30.3), (2024, 32.9), (2025, 35.7), (2026, 38.5), (2027, 41.4), (2028, 44.3), 
(2029, 47.4), (2030, 50.5), (2031, 53.5), (2032, 56.5), (2033, 59.3), (2034, 61.6), (2035, 63.8), 
(2036, 65.7), (2037, 67.7), (2038, 69.4), (2039, 70.8), (2040, 71.8) 
PRC_Nuclear__Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 2.40), (2016, 5.09), (2017, 8.07), (2018, 8.52), (2019, 8.95), (2020, 9.37), (2021, 9.74), 
(2022, 10.1), (2023, 10.4), (2024, 10.6), (2025, 10.8), (2026, 11.0), (2027, 11.2), (2028, 11.4), 
(2029, 11.7), (2030, 11.9), (2031, 12.1), (2032, 10.2), (2033, 10.4), (2034, 10.5), (2035, 10.6), 
(2036, 10.7), (2037, 10.8), (2038, 10.9), (2039, 11.0), (2040, 11.0) 
PRC_Oil_Import = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 11.8), (2016, 13.2), (2017, 14.7), (2018, 16.1), (2019, 17.6), (2020, 19.1), (2021, 20.4), 
(2022, 21.7), (2023, 22.8), (2024, 23.7), (2025, 24.6), (2026, 25.5), (2027, 26.4), (2028, 27.3), 
(2029, 28.3), (2030, 29.3), (2031, 30.2), (2032, 31.1), (2033, 32.0), (2034, 32.8), (2035, 33.5), 
(2036, 34.2), (2037, 34.9), (2038, 35.5), (2039, 36.0), (2040, 36.5) 
PRC_Perceived_US_Influence = 1.05*US_Perceived_US_Influence 
PRC_Renewables__Production = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 1.20), (2016, 1.27), (2017, 1.35), (2018, 1.42), (2019, 1.49), (2020, 3.12), (2021, 3.25), 
(2022, 3.36), (2023, 3.45), (2024, 3.53), (2025, 5.39), (2026, 5.50), (2027, 5.61), (2028, 5.71), 
(2029, 5.82), (2030, 5.93), (2031, 8.05), (2032, 8.17), (2033, 8.30), (2034, 8.40), (2035, 8.50), 
(2036, 10.7), (2037, 10.8), (2038, 10.9), (2039, 11.0), (2040, 11.0) 
PRNK_Destab_Event_Freq = 30 
Protest_Indicator = IF Protesters -DELAY(Protesters,1)>0.05 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
Radicalization_Fraction = 
Governance_Dissatisfaction+Economic_Dissatisfaction+Social_Dissatisfaction 
Religious_Conflict = 0.01 
ROC_Destab_Event_Freq = 30 
Russian_LNG_LPG_Import_Deal = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2015, 0.00), (2016, 0.00), (2017, 0.00), (2018, 1.43), (2019, 1.43), (2020, 1.43), (2021, 1.43), 
(2022, 1.43), (2023, 1.43), (2024, 1.43), (2025, 1.43), (2026, 1.43), (2027, 1.43), (2028, 1.43), 
(2029, 1.43), (2030, 1.43), (2031, 1.43), (2032, 1.43), (2033, 1.43), (2034, 1.43), (2035, 1.43), 
(2036, 1.43), (2037, 1.43), (2038, 1.43), (2039, 1.43), (2040, 1.43) 
Social_Dissatisfaction = Environmental_Concerns+Ethnic_Conflict+Religious_Conflict 
Taiwanese_Destabilizing_Event_Probability = 0 
Taiwanese_Destabilizing_Event_Year = 5 
Taiwanese__Destabilizing_Event = Taiwan_On?Off*(IF 
RANDOM(0,1)<=Taiwanese_Destabilizing_Event_Probability THEN 1 ELSE 
0)*(PULSE(15,Taiwanese_Destabilizing_Event_Year,ROC_Destab_Event_Freq)) 
Taiwan_On?Off = 0 
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Third_Party_Destabilizing_Event = Third_Party_On?Off*(IF RANDOM(0,1) 
<=Third_Party_Destabilizing_Event_Probability THEN 1 ELSE 
0)*(PULSE(5,Third_Party_Event_Year,Third_Party_Destab_Event_Freq)) 
Third_Party_Destabilizing_Event_Probability = 0 
Third_Party_Destab_Event_Freq = 30 
Third_Party_Event_Year = 5 
Third_Party_On?Off = 0 
Total_Adult_Population = Young_Adults+Mid_Adults+Seniors 













Unintentional_Quasi_MilitaryEvent_Year = 5 
Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Destabilizing_Event = 
Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_On?Off*(IF 
RANDOM(0,1)<=Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Probability THEN 1 ELSE 
0)*(PULSE(2,Unintentional_Quasi_MilitaryEvent_Year,Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_F
requency)) 
Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Frequency = 30 
Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_On?Off = 0 
Unintentional_Quasi_Military_Event_Probability = 0 
US_Change_in_Inventories = US_Change_in_Inventories_Rate*(27.63913) 
US_Change_in_Inventories_Rate = 1 
US_Desired_Level__of_Own_Influence = 30 
US_Desired_PRC_Influence = 50 
US_Economic_Driver = IF US_GDP/DELAY(US_GDP,1)<=1.1 THEN 6 ELSE 0 
 
US_Exports = US_Export_Rate*(352.89447+68.809*(TIME-2015)) 
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US_Govt_Defense_Expenditure_Rate = IF PRC_Aggessive_Influencing_Action < 10 THEN 1 
ELSE 2 
US_Govt_NDE_Rate = 1 




US_Gross_Fixed_Capital_Formation_Rate = 1 
US_HCE_Rate = 1 
US_Household_Consumption_Expenditure = US_HCE_Rate*(3033.6253 + 349.75623*(TIME-
2015)) 
US_Imports = US_Import_Rate*(316.23043+101.68043*(TIME-2015)) 
US_Import_Rate = 1 
US_Perceived_PRC_Influence = 1.05*PRC_Perceived_PRC_Influence 
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Quick Start Guide  
8 April 2015 
Prepared by: 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Department of Systems Engineering 
777 Dyer Road 
Monterey, California  93943-5001 
The views expressed in this project report are those of the contributing authors and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. The use of commercial 
products in this project and this report does not represent official endorsement by the United States 
Government or any of its departments and agencies. 





This Quick Start Guide addresses the iThink® System Dynamics (SD) model developed 
by the Naval Postgraduate School as part of a Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) for the 
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) entitled “Drivers of Conflict and Convergence in the Asia-
Pacific Region in the Next 5-25 Years”. The SMA is being conducted to:  
1. Examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends.  
2. Identify where U.S. strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Chinese and 
other interests worldwide, and in particular, to the East China Sea.  
3. Leverage opportunities when dealing with China in a “global context”  
The SMA is expected to develop an outline of areas of strategic risks and conflicting 
interests as well as potential opportunities for encouraging cooperation between the United States 
and Asia-Pacific regional actors with particular emphasis on East China Sea to better understand 
the dynamics of this complex environment and relationship. The SMA project’s period of 
performance was January 2014 to March 2015. 
In this Quick Start Guide, the term “China” will be used when referring to the nation 
officially titled the People’s Republic of China (PRC). References to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) refer to the ruling political party of the Chinese government. While comprising 
many different ethnic groups, those people residing in China will be collectively referred to as 
Chinese. 







iThink is a registered trademark of a commercial SD modeling software package 
developed and sold by isee Systems, Inc. (http://www.iseesystems.com/) which recommends the 
following minimum system requirements (Figure 1) to run iThink: 
For Windows: 
Microsoft Windows™ XP/Vista/7/8 
256 MB RAM 




Mac OS 10.6 or higher 
256 MB RAM 
200 MB disk space 
Figure 1. System Requirements for running iThink 
The iThink developer’s description page can be found on the web at 
http://www.iseesystems.com/softwares/Business/IthinkSoftware.aspx, along with links to 
tutorials, available commercial training and seminars, and contact information at isee Systems. 
OPENING THE MODEL 
iThink files are labeled with a file extension of *.itmx, *.itm, *.itr, or *.itt . The PACOM 
SMA Model filename is “NPS_Baseline_Model_2014-12-01.itmx”. Ensure this file is on the 
computer and located somewhere you can remember (e.g. on the desktop or in a file with an 
appropriate name). Once you have the iThink software installed, you can establish a default 
program association as appropriate for your operating system (Windows or Mac OS). This will 
enable you to launch the iThink application and load a model by simply double-clicking on the 
model file with one of the iThink filename extensions. 
There are two ways to open the PACOM SD model: 
• If you have already set the default program association, double-click the model’s 
filename, NPSBaslineModel07Nov2014-FrontEndAdded.itmx 
• You can also first launch the iThink application (e.g. via a shortcut icon on your desktop).  
iThink will open with a blank, untitled project as shown in Figure 2. Pull down the “File” 
menu located in the upper left corner of the initial screen, and select “Open…” Follow 
the pop-up box to locate and select the PACOM SD model file. 




UNLOCKING THE MODEL 
This section applies only to users that are authorized to unlock and modify the model. 
Once you open the model, if you do not see four tabs marked Interface, Map, Model, and 
Equation down the left side it means the model has been “locked” to prevent changes from being 
made by unauthorized persons to the model itself. The model itself will still work, the controls 
can still be manipulated by the user, and the simulation can still be run in the “locked” mode. If 
you have been authorized to change the model, you can unlock the model by pulling down the 
File menu, choosing Lock Model… and then supplying the password in the pop-up box.  
NAVIGATING THE MODEL 
Once you open the PACOM SD model, you should see the Home Page as shown in 
Figure 3. There are five tabs across the top of the Home Page: Home, Background, Explore the 
Model, Controls, and Simulation. By clicking on any of the tabs, you are taken to another page 
on the Interface level. At the bottom of each page there are “Next” and “Back” buttons that will 
take you to the next or previous page. You can skip directly to the desired page by using the 
navigation tabs at the top of the page in any page view. 
 










• Home and Background Pages - The Home and Background Pages are text pages that 
give general information to users. The Explore the Model Page (Figure 4) has an 
additional set of tabs down the left border labeled Model Overview, Energy Demand and 
Resources Sub-Model, Defense and Military Sub-Model, Political and Social Stability 
Sub-Model, and Chinese Protestor Sub-Model. Users can navigate to pages containing 
more detailed information about each of the sub-models by clicking on the tabs. The 
“Back” button on the lower left side returns the user to the next tab closer to the top of 
the page. For example, if the user is on the Chinese Protestor Sub-Model, clicking 
“Back” will navigate to the Political and Social Stability Sub-model Page. Clicking on 
“Back” again will move the user to the Defense and Military Sub-Model Page. A user 
always has the option to navigate directly to a specific page by clicking on the 
appropriate tab. 
• Controls Page - The Controls Page (Figure 5) provides users information about the 
various input devices and output graphs seen on the Simulation Page. The controls on the 
Controls Page are not actual controls. Clicking on the controls will do nothing since they 
are only pictures of the controls as seen on the Simulation Page. 
• Simulation Page - The Simulation Page (Figure 6) is the primary interface between the 
 
Figure 3. PACOM SD Model Home Page 




SD Model and most users. Unlike the Controls Page, the buttons and slider bars on the 
Simulation Page actually run the iThink model and allow users to change certain input 
parameters (see Simulation Inputs section). The Simulations Page consists of three areas 
Inputs, Outputs, and Controls. Each area is explained in more detailed in the following 
sections.  
SIMULATION INPUTS 
The Inputs section of the Simulations Page consists of on-off switches and graphical slider 
controls that enable a user to change the values of constants in the underlying simulation, or 
enable/disable certain military actions from occurring during the simulation. For each type of 
military action (e.g. Unintentional Quasi-Military Destabilizing Event or North Korean 
Destabilizing Event) there is an on/off switch and three slider controls.  
• Event Year - The first slider control (Event Year) lets a user specify the earliest year 
(from 2015 to 2040) that the event could possibly occur.  
• Event Probability - The second slider (Event Probability) lets the user set a desired 
probability that the event will occur. For example, setting the Event Probability to 0.6 
means that when the simulation reaches that possible event time, there is a 60% the event 
will occur. Setting the Event Probability to 1.0 is equivalent to saying “the Event will 
occur”. It should be noted that setting the Event Probability to 0.0 is equivalent to turning 
 
Figure 4. The Explore the Model Page. 




the on/off switch to “off” – the event will never occur.  
• Event Frequency - The third slider allows the user to specify how often (in years) the 
event can possibly reoccur. For example, setting the Event Frequency to 2.5 tells the 
simulation that every 2.5 years after the first possible occurrence (the “Event Year”) the 
simulation determines whether the event reoccurs with the probability set by the Event 
Probability. Setting the Event Frequency to 30 years in effect means the event occurs 
only once, since the overall length of simulated time is only 25 years.  
The random number generators used in the simulation currently use a new seed number each 
time the simulation is run. Thus, if you run the simulation a second time without changing any of 
the inputs, the possible destabilizing events are likely to occur at different times. It is possible to 
change the simulation so that repeated runs of the simulation have destabilizing events occurring 
at the same time each run, but doing so requires the model to be unlocked for editing and 
requires the editor to be knowledgeable about using the iThink software. 
SIMULATION OUTPUTS 
The Outputs section of the Simulations Page consists of three graphs on the left side of the page. 
Each graph shows the value of some variable or variables in the simulation as a function of 
 
Figure 5. The Controls Page. 




simulation time (years 2015-2040). There are 154 variables in the simulation that can displayed 
on graphs – users are encouraged to choose variables that are meaningful to them and support 
their analytical needs. Currently the graphs compare US and PRC Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), shows the occurrence of military and quasi-military events, and shows the level of 
tension between the US and PRC. Any of the graphs can be modified to display the information 
most useful to the user (see Changing Graphs section). 
• US and PRC GDP – this graph compares the projected GDPs of the United States and 
China for the period 2015 – 2040. 
• Military and Quasi-military Events – this graph shows the occurrence of destabilizing 
military or quasi-military events, subject to the event probabilities and frequencies set in 
the Input section. The vertical scale is a relative scale that shows how significant each 
event is in raising tensions.   
• Tension between the US and PRC – this graph shows the level of tension between the 
United States and China during the period 2015-2040. 
SIMULATION CONTROLS 
The controls to run the simulation are found at the lower left corner of the Simulation Page. The 
icon buttons conform to conventional symbology for running the simulation. 
Run – starts the simulation, or resumes simulation execution after a pause. 
Pause – temporarily halts the execution of the simulation. Pressing “Run” after “Pause” 
resumes execution of the current simulation run. 
Stop – ends execution of the simulation. Pressing “Run” after “Stop” starts a new 
simulation run. 
Reset – ends the current simulation run and resets the sliders to their default values. 





Figure 6. The Simulation Page. 
 
Modifying the Simulation 
It is generally suggested that users do not try to directly modify the underlying model unless they 
are very familiar with the iThink software and system dynamics modeling. If users wish to make 
modifications themselves and have the necessary permissions, the developers offer the following 
suggestions: 
Rule #1 – Never modify the baseline model itself. Always open the baseline model and then 
use File  Save As… to make a copy of the original baseline model with a distinct new name. 
Make your modifications and test them on the copy, not the original or baseline copy. iThink 
10.0.6 has a very limited “Undo” capability, i.e. it can only undo the last action. Don’t think that 
you can undo the last six changes you just made by repeatedly pressing an “Undo” button. 
Changing Graphs 
The graphs on the Interface Layer can be changed by double-clicking anywhere within the graph 
the user wishes to change to open a “Define Graph” Dialogue Box (Figure 7).  




To change variables displayed 
Select variables you do not wish to have displayed from the “Selected” box and press the 
“remove button”            to remove them from the graph. To add new variables to the graph, 
select the variable in the “Allowable” window and press the “Add button”             to add to the 
graph. NOTE: iThink limits the number of variables that can be shown on one graph to five (5). 
To change the type of graph 
Occasionally users may wish to display the behavior of a variable during several runs on the 
same graph for comparison purposes. Open a Define Graph Dialogue box as shown in Figure 7 
and check the “Comparative” box. Now subsequent runs will be plotted on the same graph. 
Figure 8 shows US and China tension level on six runs of the simulation plotted on the same 
graph. 
Adding New User Controls 
NOTE: Establishing a user control does not change the structure of the model, but allows a user 
to easily change the value of selected variables without having to into the model and directly 
change values in equations in the Model Layer. 
 
Figure 7. The Define Graph Dialogue Box 





To add a new user control on the Simulations Page, click on one of the control icons in the upper 
left corner (Figure 9) and then click on an empty space on the Simulation Page. A blank user 
control will be inserted on the page. Now you must assign a variable to the control. Double-click 
on the blank control to bring up a Control Dialogue box as shown in Figure 10. Choose a 
variable from the “Allowable” list and then assign it to the control by clicking the “Add” button. 
Depending on the control chosen, a number of options will be available to customize such things 
as permissible range of values, value precision, icon size, etc. 
A complete table of variables available in the NPS iThink US-China Model is included in 
Appendix A. 
 
Figure 8. A Comparative Time Series Graph of US and PRC Tension 
 
Figure 9. User Control Icons 
Slider Control 
List Control Graphic Control 
Switch Control 
Knob Control 





Figure 10. Slider Input Device Dialogue Box 




Where to Get Help 
 
Help concerning this model can be obtained by contacting the NPS Developer Team: 
Name Title Email 
Dr. Clifford Whitcomb Principal Investigator cawhitco@nps.edu 
Mr. Paul Beery Faculty Associate ptbeery@nps.edu 
Mr. Gary Parker Faculty Associate gwparker@nps.edu 
Mr. Chris Wolfgeher Faculty Associate cwolfghe@nps.edu 




References and Resources 
• The iThink software is developed by isee Systems, Inc. whose website is 
www.iseesystems.com.   
The isee Systems website includes several resources to include articles about systems 
thinking, training available for the iThink and STELLA software, and product 
descriptions. 
• An 86-page pdf document titled, “Getting started with iThink and STELLA”, 
dated January 2013, is available for download at the following URL: 
http://www.thoughtmap.com/storage/files/Getting%20Started%20with%20iThink%20and%20STELLA.pdf 
• A well-known textbook for systems dynamics is Dr. John Sterman’s “Business 
Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World”, 2000, 
McGraw-Hill, ISBN: 978-0-07-321135-8 








Based on conversations with subject matter experts at 
CEIP, START and Monitor 360, five categories of 
military actions were developed. These actions are 
considered to be destabilizing actions that increase 
tension. (Dimensionless) 
Centenarian Rate Rate at which seniors leave the potential protestor population. (People/yr) 
Child Migration Rate at which children migrate out of China. (People/yr) 
Childhood Mortality Rate Rate at which children leave the total Chinese population. (People/yr) 
Children Total number of children in the Chinese population. (People) 
Contact Rate 
Control variable which governs the flow of people from 
the potential protestor group to the protestor group. 
(Dimensionless) 
Crude Birth Rate Rate at which the total Chinese population can generate children.  (People/yr) 
Direct PRC Actions to 
Lower Tension 
Actions taken by China to reduce the level of tension in 
US-China relations. (dimensionless) 
Direct US Actions to 
Lower Tension 
Actions taken by the US to reduce the level of tension in 
US-China relations. (dimensionless) 
Economic Dissatisfaction Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to economic concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Energy Demand per PRC 
HH 
Annualized Chinese energy demand per household (HH) 
in BTU equivalents.  Chinese household energy demand 
per household is forecast to decrease from 2015 to 2040 
due to a combination of factors, including a reduced 
number of persons per household, more energy efficient 
buildings, and planned upgrades to energy transmission 
infrastructure. 
Environmental Concerns Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to environmental concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Ethnic Conflict Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to ethnic concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Governance 
Dissatisfaction 
Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to 
governance concerns.  (Dimensionless) 




Intentional Quasi Military 
Destabilizing Event 
An example of an intentional quasi-military action would 
be the establishment of an exclusion zone by China. 
Usually the purpose of this would be to gauge the resolve 
of the opposing nation. In the example of the most recent 
exclusion zone established by China, the U.S. and Japan 
responded with their quasi-military action of continuing to 
send aircraft or ships through the zone. These incidents 
have the potential to escalate based on the resolve of each 
nation. When China set up the exclusion zone and the 
U.S. and Japan sent fighters through the zone, China 
scrambled jets but did not escalate the situation further. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Frequency 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  
Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event On?Off 
Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  
Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year 
and with the frequency specified. 
Intentional Quasi Military 
Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability 
that the event occurs in this year is set by 'event 
probability.'  The event will re-occur every xx years, as 
specified by frequency. 
Live Births Rate at which children join the total Chinese population.  Random variable with Normal distribution. (People/yr) 
Majority Rate Rate at which children become young adults (People/yr) 
Maturing Rate Rate at which young adults become mid-adults (People) 
Mid Adult Death Rate Rate at which mid-adults leave the total Chinese population. (People/yr) 
Mid Adult Migration Rate at which mid-adults migrate out of China. (People/yr) 
Mid Adults Total number of mid-adults in the Chinese population. (People) 
Net Migration Rate Rate at which all population groups migrate out of China.(People/yr) 
North Korea On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
North Korean 
Destabilizing Event 
Currently, China has publicly condemned North Korea’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, a change in rhetoric 
by North Korea, such as the threat of collapse, could alter 
China’s policy toward North Korea. It could cause China 
to change its stance on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 
This would likely lead to more aggressive U.S. 
intervention to stop nuclear proliferation, and this would 
certainly raise tensions to the highest levels. 







Probability that this type of event will occur in the year 
and with the frequency specified. 
North Korean 
Destabilizing Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability 
that the event occurs in this year is set by 'event 
probability.'  The event will re-occur every xx years, as 
specified by frequency. 
Number of PRC 
Households 
Projected number of households in China  The number of 
Chinese households is forecast to increase in 25 years 
from approximately 430 million to a little over 500 
million.   This is due to both projected population increase 
and decreasing average Chinese household size.   
Household size is decreasing due to a combination of 
Chinese incentives promoting urbanization, reduced 
number of children per couple, and a growing middle 
class which tends to have fewer children per household. 
Potential Protesters 
Group within the total Chinese population that has the 
potential to become protestors.  The very young and very 
old typically do not become protestors. (People) 
Potential Protestor Flow Rate at which the total adult population can become potential protestors. (People/yr) 
PRC Aggressive 
Influencing Action 
Action taken by the Chinese to increase actual/perceived 
influence.  The use of the word aggressive signifies that 
this action is beyond normal Chinese action and is meant 
to send a clear message. (dimensionless) 
PRC Change in 
Inventories Projected Chinese on hand inventories ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Change in 
Inventories Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in Chinese inventories . 
PRC Coal  Consumption Stock representing Chinese Coal consumption (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Coal Import Graphical variable of projected yearly coal imports (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Desired Level of 
Own Influence 
Level of influence China desires to have within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Desired US 
Influence 
Level of influence China desires the US to have within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Domestic Coal 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly coal production 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Domestic LNG LPG 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly domestic 
LNG/LPG production (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Domestic Oil 
Production 
Graphical variable of projected yearly domestic oil 
production (Quadrillion BTU) 




PRC Economic Driver Control variable linking Chinese GDP to influence within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Economic 
Influencing Action 
Economic actions China takes to reduce the level of 




percentage of energy resources consumed from domestic 
environmentally-damaging sources such as coal, oil and 
LNG-LPG with respect to China's overall total energy 
resource consumption. The higher the percentage, the 
more potential damage might be done to China's 
environment. (%) 
PRC Energy Import Risk 
Percentage 
Percent of total Chinese energy consumption provided by 
imports. (%)  As China becomes more reliant on external 
sources of energy to meet its economic goals, the state 
perceives more risk to its energy import activities by other 
nations.   That risk is one driver why China is looking to 
expand its near off-shore influence and control as well as 
expand the reach of the PLAN to protect vital energy 
import sea lanes. 
PRC Export Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese gross export. 
PRC Exports Projected Chinese gross exports. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Final Consumption 
Expenditure 
Project Chinese govt and household expenditures. 
($Billions 2012) 
PRC GDP Projected total Chinese Gross Domestic Product.  ($Billions 2012) 
PRC GDP Per Capita Chinese Per capita GDP.  ($Billions 2012/person) 
PRC Govt Defense 
Expenditure 
Projected Chinese govt defense expenditures. ($Billions 
2012) 
PRC Govt Defense 
Expenditure Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in Chinese DE. 
PRC Govt NDE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese NDE. 
PRC Govt NonDefense 
Expenditure 
Projected Chinese govt non-defense expenditures. 
($Billions 2012) 
PRC Gross Capital 
Formation 
Projected Chinese capital formation which includes fixed 
capital and value of inventories. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Projected Chinese capital formation. ($Billions 2012) 
PRC Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in Chinese gross fixed capital formation. 
PRC HCE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese HCE. 




PRC Heavy Industry 
Demand 
The Chinese economy's projected demand for energy to 
support construction, mining, commercial transportation, 
traditional manufacturing, etc. The majority of Chinese 
military energy demand falls into this category. 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Heavy Industry 
Energy Demand 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected 
demand for energy to support construction, mining, 
commercial transportation, traditional manufacturing, etc.   
The majority of Chinese military energy demand falls into 
this category. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Heavy Industry 
Energy Flow 
The Chinese economy's projected annualized demand for 
energy to support construction, mining, commercial 
transportation, traditional manufacturing, etc.   The 
majority of Chinese military energy demand falls into this 
category. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
PRC HH Demand The Chinese household's projected demand for energy (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC HH Demand Flow The Chinese household's projected annualized demand for energy. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
PRC HH Energy Demand 
Annualized 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected 




Projected Chinese household consumptions expenditures.  
($Billions 2012) 
PRC Hydro Electric 
Production 
Chinese projected production of energy from 
hydroelectric energy sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Import Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in Chinese gross inports. 
PRC Imports Gross Chinese imports.  Affected by Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption.  ($Billions 2012) 
PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas (LPG): Broken down by amount imported primarily 
by sea through the PACOM AOR and by existing or 
planned pipelines from the 2014 Russian-Chinese LMG-
LPG agreement and domestically produced. (Quadrillion 
BTU) 
PRC LNG LPG Imports 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected 
demand for imported Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Net Exports 
Projected Chinese net exports.  Net exports are influenced 
by the number of chinese protestors in the social and 
demographivs sub-model.  ($Billions 2012) 




PRC NHR Consumption 
Nuclear-Hydroelectric-Renewables (NHR) broken down 
by domestic nuclear production, hydro-electric 
production, and renewables to include solar, wind and 
biomass production. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non HH Energy 
Demand 
Total energy demand from Chinese heavy industry and 
non-industrial sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non Industrial  
Energy Demand 
Graphical variable of the Chinese economy's projected 
demand for energy to support information technologies, 
office buildings, education facilities, health care facilities, 
etc.   The majority of Chinese state government energy 
demand falls into this category with the exception of state 
owned heavy industrial companies. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non Industrial 
Demand 
The Chinese economy's projected demand for energy to 
support information technologies, office buildings, 
education facilities, health care facilities, etc.   The 
majority of Chinese state government energy demand falls 
into this category with the exception of state owned heavy 
industrial companies. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Non Industrial 
Energy Flow 
The Chinese economy's projected annualized demand for 
for energy to support information technologies, office 
buildings, education facilities, health care facilities, etc.   
The majority of Chinese state government energy demand 
falls into this category with the exception of state owned 
heavy industrial companies. (Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
PRC Nuclear Production Chinese projected production of energy from all nuclear energy sources. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Oil Consumption 
Stock representing Chinese oil consumption; primary 
liquid crude, broken down by amount imported and 
domestically produced. (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Oil Import Graphical variable of projected yearly oil imports (Quadrillion BTU) 
PRC Perceived PRC 
Influence 
Level of influence China perceives itself as having within 
the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Perceived US 
Influence 
Level of influence China perceives the US as having 
within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
PRC Renewables  
Production 
Chinese projected production of energy from all 
renewable (except hydroelectric) energy sources. 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
PRNK Destab Event Freq Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Protest Impact on 
Influence 
Control variable linking civil unrest in China with 
Chinese influence within the PACOM AOR. 
(dimensionless) 
Protest Indicator Control variable set when the total number of protestors increases faster that a given rate.  (Dimensionless) 




Protester Rate Rate at which the population of potential protestors becomes protestors. (People/yr) 
Protesters Total Chinese population of protestors. (People) 
Radicalization Fraction 
Control variable which governs the flow of people from 
the potential protestor group to the protestor group.  
Contains economic, social, and governance 
dissatisfaction. (Dimensionless) 
Religious Conflict Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to religious concerns.  (Dimensionless) 
Retirement Rate Rate at which mid-adults become seniors. (People/yr) 
ROC Destab Event Freq Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Russian LNG LPG 
Import Deal 
Graphical variable depicting potential for China and 
Russia to agree to LNG/LPG pipeline and trade 
agreement. (Quadrillion BTU) 
Senior Death Rate Rate at which seniors leave the total Chinese population(People/yr) 
Senior Migration Rate at which seniors migrate out of China. (People/yr) 
Seniors Total number of seniors in the Chinese population(People) 
Social Dissatisfaction 
Fraction of Chinese population dissatisfied due to 
religious, ethnic, or environmental concerns.  
(Dimensionless) 
Stabilizing Actions Actions taken by the US or China to reduce the level of tension in relations. (dimensionless) 
Taiwan On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off. Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event 
This is the least likely but also the most dangerous 
scenario. This will bring tensions to the highest levels and 
likely lead to war if the situation isn’t balanced by a 
stabilizing action. An example of this would be if the 
Chinese government loses patience with the continued 
sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan, or if the U.S. gives Taiwan a 
new technology that significantly increases Taiwan’s 
defense capabilities. This could cause the Chinese to 
respond with an aggressive military action. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year 
and with the frequency specified. 
Taiwanese Destabilizing 
Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability 
that the event occurs in this year is set by 'event 
probability.’ The event will re-occur every xx years, as 
specified by frequency. 




Tension between US and 
China Analogue for US-Chinese relations. (dimensionless) 
Third Party Destab Event 
Freq 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  
Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Third Party Destabilizing 
Event 
This is different from the 2nd category because it 
originates with an action initiated from a third party 
whereas the above scenario deals with a Chinese or U.S. 
action specifically in Taiwan or North Korea. An example 
of this would be if Japan took actions to aggressively 
occupy South China Sea islands, and was confronted by 
Chinese military units. Even though the U.S. may not 
agree with Japanese actions, they could get dragged into a 
conflict based on their treaty obligations. Similarly, if 
North Korea’s nuclear development reaches a level that 
the U.S. perceives as dangerous, this could cause the U.S. 
to take action, and these actions could invoke the Sino-
North Korean treaty obligating China to get involved.  
This scenario likely could be resolved by China and U.S. 
unless one of those two nations responds very 
aggressively to the third party. 
Third Party Destabilizing 
Event Probability 
Probability that this type of event will occur in the year 
and with the frequency specified. 
Third Party Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability 
that the event occurs in this year is set by 'event 
probability.'  The event will re-occur every xx years, as 
specified by frequency. 
Third Party On?Off Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  Equivalent to setting event probability to zero. 
Total Adult Population Total Chinese adult population. (People) 
Total Population Total Chinese population. (People) 
Total PRC Coal 
Consumption 
Projected annualized projected PRC coal consumption 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC Coal 
Consumption Flow 
Flow variable to translate Total_PRC_Coal_Consumption 
into a stock (Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
Total PRC Consumption 
Annualized Flow 
Projected, annualized flow variable translating Chinese 
energy resource consumption into a stock.  (Quadrillion 
BTU/yr) 
Total PRC Demand 
Annualized Flow 
Flow variable to translate total annual energy into a stock 
(Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
Total PRC Energy 
Consumption 
Projected Chinese energy resource consumption in four 
primary categories:  Coal, oil, LNG/LPG/, and 
Nuclear/Hydro/Renewables.  (Quadrillion BTU) 




Total PRC Energy 
Demand 
Total Chinese energy demand from household, heavy 
industry, and non-industrial demand sources.  (Quadrillion 
BTU) 
Total PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption 
The Chinese economy's projected annual demand for 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) (Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
Total PRC LNG LPG 
Consumption Flow 
The Chinese household's projected annualized demand for 
LNG/LPG. (Quadrillion BTU/year) 
Total PRC NHR 
Consumption 
Projected annualized projected PRC NHR consumption 
(Quadrillion BTU) 
Total PRC NHR 
Consumption Flow 
Flow variable to translate NHR consumption into a stock 
(Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
Total PRC Oil 
Consumption 
The Chinese economy's projected annual demand for oil. 
(Quadrillion BTU/yr) 
Total PRC Oil 
Consumption Flow 
Flow variable to translate Total_PRC_Oil_Consumption 




An example of an unintentional action is a collision at sea 
by a Chinese vessel and one from a U.S. or allied nation. 
This situation could potentially escalate depending on the 
actions of the local actors involved. In the past, these 
situations have raised tensions but usually are resolved 
through discussions between leaders of both governments. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event Frequency 
Frequency with which this type of event will occur.  
Probability will affect each year of occurrence. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event On?Off 
Control variable which turns this type of event on or off.  




Probability that this type of event will occur in the year 
and with the frequency specified. 
Unintentional Quasi 
Military Event Year 
First year that this type of event may occur.  Probability 
that the event occurs in this year is set by 'event 
probability.’ The event will re-occur every xx years, as 
specified by frequency. 
US Aggressive 
Influencing Action 
Action taken by the US to increase actual/perceived 
influence.  The use of the word aggressive signifies that 
this action is beyond normal US action and is meant to 
send a clear message. (dimensionless) 
US Change in Inventories Projected US on hand inventories ($Billions 2012) 
US Change in Inventories 
Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in US inventories. 
US Desired Level of Own 
Influence 
Level of influence the US desires within PACOM AOR. 
(dimensionless) 
US Desired PRC 
Influence 
Level of influence the US desires China to have within the 
PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 




US Economic Driver Control variable linking US GDP to influence within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
US Economic Influencing 
Action 
Economic actions the US takes to reduce the level of 
tension in US-China relations. (dimensionless) 
US Export Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US gross export. 
US Exports Projected US gross exports. ($Billions 2012) 
US Final Consumption 
Expenditure 
Project US govt and household expenditures. ($Billions 
2012) 
US GDP Projected total US Gross Domestic Product.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Govt Defense 
Expenditure Projected US govt defense expenditures. ($Billions 2012) 
US Govt Defense 
Expenditure Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in US DE. 
US Govt NDE Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US NDE. 
US Govt NonDefense 
Expenditure 
Projected US govt non-defense expenditures. ($Billions 
2012) 
US Gross Capital 
Formation 
Projected US capital formation which includes fixed 
capital and value of inventories. ($Billions 2012) 
US Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Projected US capital formation. ($Billions 2012) 
US Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Rate 
Control variable allowing user to input a percentage 
change in US gross fixed capital formation. 




Projected US household consumptions expenditures.  
($Billions 2012) 
US Import Rate Control variable allowing user to input a percentage change in US gross imports. 
US Imports Gross US imports.  Affected by Total_PRC_Energy_Consumption.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Net Exports 
Projected US net exports.  Net exports are influenced by 
the number of US protestors in the social and 
demographics sub-model.  ($Billions 2012) 
US Perceived PRC 
Influence 
Level of influence the US perceives China as having 
within the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
US Perceived US 
Influence 
Level of influence the US perceives itself as having within 
the PACOM AOR. (dimensionless) 
Young Adult Death Rate Rate at which young adults leave the total Chinese population (People/yr) 






Young Adult Migration Rate at which young adults migrate out of China. (People/yr) 
Young Adults Total number of young adults in the Chinese population (People) 
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